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ABSTRACT 
GOVERNMENTAL MICROCREDIT AND POVERTY REDUCTION: 
EVIDENCE FROM RURAL VIETNAM 
By 
Thi Tuyet Trinh Pham 
The thesis aims to assess the poverty targeting of the preferential credit programme 
for the poor from Vietnam Bank for Social Policies and its impacts on household 
welfare, in terms of income from profits per capita, consumption expenditure per 
capita, and food consumption expenditure per capita, in rural areas of Vietnam. Using 
data from Vietnam Household Living Standards Surveys from 2004 to 2012, the study 
finds that the programme has not sufficiently targeted the poor, with low coverage 
rate and high leakage rate. Likewise, the programme seems not so pro-poor, that is, it 
fails to target the poorer strata of the rural households. To examine the impacts of the 
programme, the study employs household and commune fixed-effects to control for 
unobserved and time-invariant attributes that may both affect the outcome variable 
and the participation status of the households. The study also uses an instrumental 
variable which is access to credit to control for other endogeneity problems. With 
three different data panels constructed: 2004-2006, 2006-2008, and 2010-2012, 
estimation results suggest that the microfinance programme has statistically 
significant positive impact on household income from profits for the first period. The 
impacts, however, turned out to be insignificant in the latter two periods 2006-2008, 
and 2010-2012, even though the coefficients still suggest a positive effect. The study 
also finds no evidence on the impacts of participating in this programme on other 
household welfare proxies, including consumption expenditure, and food 
consumption expenditure. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
Over the past few decades, microfinance1 has gained increasing interest from policy 
makers and scholars. Microfinance institutions appear to play significant roles in 
improving access to finance, positively contributing to the global poverty alleviation. 
Increasing attention has been even more drawn to microfinance since Muhammad 
Yunus, the founder of Grameen Bank, the pioneering Bangladeshi credit delivery 
system that provides banking services targeted at the rural poor to stimulate business 
activities and reduce the poverty, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006. 
In Vietnam, microfinance has been developing since the Doi moi2 (Renovation) 
in 1986. However, there was no legal and regulatory framework for microfinance 
institutions until 2010, when the Credit Institution Law was enacted, integrating 
microfinance into the formal banking system. As of now, the microfinance system 
consists of three sectors: formal sector (e.g. Vietnam Bank for Social Policies, 
Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, People’s Credit Funds), semi-
formal sector (e.g. socio-political organizations, non-government organizations), and 
informal sector (e.g. friends, relatives, money lenders). 
Regarding formal sector in general and state-owned microfinance institutions 
in particular, the Vietnamese Government has introduced several microcredit 
programmes, mainly through the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies, aiming to ease the 
credit constraints of poor rural households and provide them with capital inputs for 
production activities, life amelioration and poverty reduction, contributing to the 
implementation of the ‘National Target Programme on Hunger Elimination, Poverty 
                                                 
1 In this study, microfinance and microcredit are used interchangeably. However, in literature, 
microfinance also refers to different financial services such as savings, insurance, etc.  
2 Doi Moi (Renovation) was mandated in December 1986 by the Vietnamese Government with the 
purpose of shifting from a centrally-planned economy to a market oriented one, inside the framework 
of state regulations.  
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Alleviation and Employment’ (Vietnam Bank for Social Policies, 2003a). Despite the 
importance of these programmes, questions regarding poverty targeting and their 
impacts have been discussed by only few studies. Generally, among different 
programmes, the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies’ lending-to-the-poor programme is 
found not to be very pro-poor in terms of targeting, but the programme has improved 
household welfare, business production, and reduced the poverty rate of the 
participants (Cuong, 2008; Lensink & Pham, 2012). 
To contribute to the ongoing discussion about microfinance, particularly, 
governmental microcredit in Vietnam, the study aims to examine the extent to which 
the governmental lending-to-the-poor programme has targeted the poor, and its 
impacts on household welfare and poverty reduction in rural areas of Vietnam, using 
data from Vietnam Household Living Standards Surveys 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 
2012.  
The study is structured into 6 sections. The remaining part of section 1 
provides an overview of microfinance system in Vietnam, and the Vietnam Bank for 
Social Policies. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature of microfinance in general, 
and microfinance in Vietnam in particular. Section 3 explains the nature of the data. 
Section 4 presents the analysis and discussion on poverty targeting of the programme. 
Specifically, the study first compares the socio-economic characteristics of the 
programme beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries to find whether the average 
beneficiaries are poorer than the non-beneficiaries. The study then calculates the 
inclusion error rate or leakage rate of the programme, as well as the coverage rate, the 
credit amount and average interest rate for eligible and ineligible groups. Finally, by 
classifying the rural households into 5 quantiles, in terms of household income per 
capita, consumption expenditure per capita, durable score, and socio-economic score, 
3 
 
the study was able to examine whether the beneficiaries belong to the poorer strata of 
the society. Section 5 presents the estimation strategy, data sets, empirical results and 
discussion on the impacts of the programme on household welfare and poverty 
reduction. To be more specific, in this section, the study estimates the impact of credit 
on income from profits, consumption expenditure and food consumption expenditure 
across households using fixed-effects model, with and without instrumental variable. 
The last section concludes the study and makes policy recommendations.   
1.2. Overview of Microfinance in Vietnam 
The economic reform initiated in 1986 has transformed Vietnam towards a market-
oriented economy with outstanding achievements in economic growth (Dao, 2001; 
Dao, 2002). The country has remarkably reduced its poverty incidence from 58% in 
1993 to less than 6% in 2014. However, rural areas seem to be lagged behind, with 
disproportionately high poverty rate compared to that of urban areas: the rural poor 
accounted for over 90% of total number of poor households of the country (Ministry 
of Labour, War Invalids and Social Affairs, 2015). Likewise, there was only about 11% 
of the poorest 40% of the population that has an account in a formal financial 
institution  in 2011 (Demirgüç-Kunt & Klapper, 2012), which indicates the 
importance of ensuring provision of financial services to the rural poor for the 
purpose of improving business production and living standards, and reducing poverty. 
Initially, the microfinance system in Vietnam was mainly driven by the 
Government in the 1980s and 1990s, as a result of the economic reform and the 
opening up to foreign market. The Government’s decentralization, which delegated 
greater autonomy to regions, has favoured the growth of the microfinance in the 
country, leading to a complex system which has been characterized by the coexistence 
of state-driven and market-based approaches with three sectors: formal sector, semi-
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formal sector, and informal sector (Asian Development Bank, 2014). In 2010, the 
Credit Institution Law was enacted, being considered as a milestone that integrates 
microfinance into the formal banking system. 
  
Figure 1.1: Population and Poverty Rate of Vietnam over the 2004-2014 period 
Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam 
The formal sector plays important roles in the microfinance system, 
constituting a large proportion in the market share. By the end of 2013, the two main 
institutions: Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, and Vietnam 
Bank for Social Policies collectively accounted for over 80% of total microfinance 
clients and total outstanding loans, of which, Vietnam Bank for Social Policies alone 
constituted 67% of total borrowers and 65% of microloans outstanding (Asian 
Development Bank, 2014). Besides, the formal sector also includes People’s Credit 
Funds, whose network has been gradually set up since 1993, following the member-
based and member-owned model, with the main function of mobilising savings from 
its members and provide credit to households and individuals (Wolz, 1999; Putzeys, 
2002). As of 2014, there are 1,130 member-based PCFs (Asian Development Bank, 
2014). 
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The semiformal sector includes non-banking institutions which are authorised 
to provide limited financial services. By the end of 2013, there has been about 50 
major semiformal microfinance institutions which are supported mostly by mass 
organizations, social funds of local governments, and donors participating in the 
system (Asian Development Bank, 2014). 
Table 1.1: Microfinance Lending in Vietnam  
Institutions 
 Number of 
Borrowers (million) 
 
Outstanding Loans 
(US$ million) 
 2010 2012 2013  2010 2012 2013 
Vietnam Bank for Social Policies  7.8 5.76a 6.98a  4,398 4,412 5,350 
Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and  
                        Rural Development 
 3.2 1.63 1.49  3,500 1,452 1,390 
People’s Credit Funds  0.95 1.07 1.12  1,006 1,051 1,294 
Microfinance Institutionsb  0.55 0.73 0.77  122 180 189 
Total  12.5 9.19 10.36  9,206 6,285 8,223 
Note: aVietnam Bank for Social Policies’ number of borrowers for 2012 and 2013 were lower than 
2010 mainly because of consolidation of individual accounts into household accounts. 
         bMicrofinance Institutions include formal and semi-formal institutions. 
Source: (Asian Development Bank, 2014) 
The informal sector includes money lenders, family members, friends and 
those known as ‘Hue/Hui’ (Rotating Savings and Credit Associations). Back in 1990s, 
‘Informal’ was the main sector that enabled households, especially rural ones, to 
access the credit. Most of the loans were not charged with interest, especially those 
that were lent by a family member through the associations (Nghiem et al., 2006). 
However, if a household was to borrow from informal lenders, they were often 
charged with a really high interest rates, for example above 4% per month (McCarty, 
2001; Barslund & Tarp, 2008; Poon & Thai, 2010). 
1.3. Overview of Vietnam Bank for Social Policies  
Vietnam Bank for Social Policies was established in 2003, based on the re-
organization of the Bank for the Poor and separation from Vietnam Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development. The bank is considered as an efficient tool of the 
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Government in mobilising various domestic and international resources to perform the 
designated socio-policy lending programmes of the Government (Vietnam Bank for 
Social Policies, 2003a). Since its establishment, the bank has developed and gained 
remarkable achievements, contributing greatly to the poverty alleviation and the 
restriction of money-lenders’ activities in rural areas. By 2013, the bank has an 
extensive outreach of 100% commune, with the total outstanding loans of VND 
121,699 billion (approximately US$5,766.33 million), making 17 fold increase 
compared to that of 2003 (Vietnam Bank for Social Policies, 2014). 
 
Figure 1.2: Vietnam Bank for Social Policies’ Financial Performance (2004-2014)  
Source: Summary from Vietnam Bank for Social Policies Annual Reports 2004-2014 
The bank provides subsidized and preferential credit to a wide range of target 
groups, including, for example, poor households, near-poor households, 
underprivileged students, business and production households living in specially 
disadvantaged areas and communes, migrant workers, extremely disadvantaged ethnic 
minorities, etc. (See Appendix 1). 
The bank has implemented the method of entrusted lending process to ensure 
the quick delivery of loans to the poor as well as other social beneficiaries. There are 
four mass organizations participating in the process, including Farmer Union of 
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Vietnam, War Veteran Union of Vietnam, Women Union of Vietnam, and Youth 
Union of Vietnam. While these organizations are responsible for some lending steps 
(e.g. establishing credit and savings groups, organizing certifying poor households, 
supervising and urging borrowers in using loans properly), the bank itself conducts 
loan disbursement, loan collection and safe treasury management (Vietnam Bank for 
Social Policies, 2003a). 
Among different microcredit schemes, lending to the poor households is the 
main programme which constitutes approximately 81.2%, 52.3%, 40.4% and 36.5% 
of the bank’s loan portfolio in 2004, 2008, 2010 and 2012 respectively (See Appendix 
1). There are several criteria that a household should meet to borrow from this 
programme, for instance, the household should have a permanent or long-term 
residence permit at the location of the lender, and be in the list of poor households3 of 
the local commune, district and town (or household has a permanent or long-term 
residence in poor communes according to the programme 1354 of the Government). 
Although the borrower is not required for collateral and is exempted from borrowing 
fee, they must be a member of credit and savings group, selected by the group and 
named in the list proposed to get a loan with certification of Commune People’s 
Committee (Vietnam Bank for Social Policies, 2003b).  
As mentioned, the microcredit programme for poor households is designed as 
a group-based lending scheme. In other words, to be eligible for the programme, a 
household must be a member of credit and savings group in their locality. Once 
joining the group, they can apply for the loan by submitting a formatted application, 
                                                 
3 The classification procedure is rather complicated. Basically, whether a household is classified as 
poor by the local authority depends on the poverty standard set up by the Ministry of Labour, War 
Invalids and Social Affairs, and other specific criteria set up by each commune.  
4  Programme 135 is the national programme targeting the most vulnerable, disadvantaged ethnic 
minority-inhabited and mountainous communes, promoting production and access to basic 
infrastructure, improving education, training local officials and raising people's awareness for better 
living standards and quality of life.  
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specifying the amount and purpose of the loan that they intend to take to Head of 
credit group. Upon receiving the application, the credit group will arrange a meeting 
of all members to consider which household is able to borrow and prepare a list of 
applicants. This list will then be subject to ratification by the Commune People’s 
Committee. Once the list is ratiﬁed by the People’s Committee, it will be sent to a 
branch for ﬁnal approval (Vietnam Bank for Social Policies, 2003b). A household can 
borrow many times, but the total outstanding loans cannot exceed the maximum 
amount available for each poor household stated by the bank for a specific period. 
Generally, the loan due is up to 5 years (Vietnam Bank for Social Policies, 2009). 
 Theoretically, only households who are classified as poor by the local 
authorities, or reside in poor communes should be eligible to borrow from the bank. 
However, to ensure high repayment rate, the process of lending and monitoring the 
credit is rather stringent, which then makes the bank’s mission of providing the truly 
poor with preferential credit gets attenuated. To be more specific, because the 
repayment rate can affect the amount of funding that a branch can receive, each 
branch will try to keep their overdue outstanding loans as low as possible. Credit 
groups and the People’s Committee are also highly responsible for the repayment of 
credit group members, so they tend to exclude the very poor households who might 
not be able to repay loans from the list of applicants (Dufhues et al., 2002). As a result, 
non-poor or even better-off households, who are expected to have higher capacity to 
repay the loans, can actually receive nominations from the communal authorities and 
get credits from the bank. 
1.4. Objectives, Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The study examines how well the microcredit programme reaches the poor in the rural 
areas of Vietnam, to what extent the programme positively affects household welfare, 
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in terms of income from profits, consumption expenditure, and food consumption 
expenditure. The research aims to answer two main questions:  
(1) Is governmental microcredit programme pro-poor in terms of poverty targeting? 
(2) What are the impacts of governmental microcredit programme on household 
welfare, in terms of income from profits, consumption and food consumption 
expenditure? 
The aim and objectives of this study are inspirited by the belief that 
governmental microcredit programme is not so poverty targeting, and that given the 
right policy environment and innovative financial technologies, this can make 
substantial positive contributions to the poverty alleviation strategy. The main 
hypotheses of this study are therefore as follows: 
(1) Governmental microcredit programme is not pro-poor in terms of targeting. 
(2) Governmental microcredit has positive impacts on household welfare, poverty 
reduction. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Review of Empirical Studies on Microfinance 
Microfinance has been extensively examined with large resulting literature, however, 
its poverty targeting and impacts on poverty reduction remain highly controversial. 
First, regarding poverty targeting, although there is a consensus that 
microfinance should target the poor, there are different schools of thought on who 
should be targeted (Diop et al., 2007). On the one hand, proponents of the first school 
of thought argue that microfinance should target the less poor and strengthen their 
productive activities, because their consumption is theoretically more likely to lead to 
the creation of jobs and thus by trickle-down, provoking a positive ripple effect on the 
entire local population, especially on the needy (Diop et al., 2007). The proponents 
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also argue that credit cannot be easily targeted to reach the poor because they are in 
no position to undertake an economic activity, many poor people, especially (but not 
only) the poorest of the poor, cannot make use of credit (Garson, 2001). With this 
position, the main goal of microfinance is financial efficiency, which allows 
Microfinance institutions to expand financial services, hence reducing poverty on a 
larger scale.  
On the other hand, microfinance is expected to target the poorest5 directly, no 
matter how difficult or costly. The reasons are that: targeting the less poor reinforces 
existing inequality and the mechanisms of domination, and the inability to invest is 
the principal obstacle to productive activity. Besides, they believe ‘redistribution by 
the creation of jobs or consumption’, as argued by the first school of thought, ‘does 
not necessarily benefit the poorest’ (Diop et al., 2007, 33). Concerning the financial 
efficiency, financial performance of microfinance institutions targeted the poorest 
clients have been found to be comparable to those of microfinance institutions that do 
not reach the poorest (Gibbons et al., 2000; Woller, 2000). However, it is worth 
noting that there is also a growing consensus that microfinance is not for everyone, 
that entrepreneurial skills and ability are necessary for potential customers to be able 
to take on debt, especially for the poorest (Morduch & Haley, 2002). 
Regarding poverty targeting, empirical studies have found that microfinance 
has insufficiently penetrated the poorer strata of the society, and that clients of 
microfinance tend to be hunched around the poverty line, rather than below it 
(Morduch & Haley, 2002; Copestake et al., 2005). There are several possible reasons 
that make targeting the poor more difficult and challenging. First, it could be the 
eligibility criteria imposed by microfinance institutions that places bias toward non-
                                                 
5 The Microcredit Summit defined the poorest as those people in the bottom fifty percent of the people 
living in a country’s nationally defined poverty-line (the poor are those living below the poverty line). 
11 
 
poor or better-off clients. Second, the model of microcredit may be simply incapable 
of reaching the very poor. Third, it could be the problems of self-exclusion, and lack 
of participation sustainability (Chowdhury et al., 2004; Diop et al., 2007). It is argued 
that unless there is an active poverty - targeting tool, the poorest will either be missed 
or they will tend to exclude themselves because they do not see the programmes as 
being for them, i.e. the inclusion of better-off people may well discourage the poorest 
group from participating (Navajas et al. 2000; Simanowitz et al., 2000). It is, therefore, 
important to design a programme that caters to their needs to reach the poorest.  
Second, there are opposite positions regarding the impacts of microfinance on 
household welfare and poverty reduction. 
On the one hand, microcredit has proven to be a viable, effective and powerful 
tool for promoting production, smoothing income flows and consumption cost, 
improving welfare and enhancing the capacity of poor households to maintain their 
gains.  
A study on microfinance and poverty alleviation in Asia and the Pacific by 
Quinones & Remenyi (2014) shows that household income of families with access to 
microcredit is much higher than for comparable households without access to credit. 
For instance, Indonesia indicated a 12.9% annual average rise in income from 
borrowers and only 3% rise from non-borrowers. Similarly, in Sri-Lanka, a 15.6% 
increase in income from borrowers was observed while only 9% increase was 
reported from non-borrowers.  
In another study reviewing cases that provide appropriate and quality financial 
services for the poor, Wright (2000) notes that the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh ‘not 
only reduced poverty and improved welfare of participating households but also 
enhanced the household’s capacity to sustain their gains over time’.  
12 
 
A less controversial and perhaps the most reliable impact evaluation of 
microfinance programme, Khandker's 2005 paper shows positive results on the impact 
of microfinance on poverty reduction. Additionally, the impact is reported to be 
greater for extreme poverty (2.2 percentage points per year) than for moderate poverty 
(1.6 percentage points per year). This study also implies spill-over effects of the 
programme: microfinance reduced poverty among non-participants by about 1.0 and 
1.3 percentage points a year for moderate poverty and extreme poverty, respectively. 
Based on these findings, the author concluded that 40% of the entire reduction of 
moderate poverty in rural Bangladesh was accounted by microfinance. 
On the other hand, programmes providing poor households with credit are 
found not to be always effective in improving welfare and reducing poverty.  
Studies by Hulme & Mosley (1996) in seven developing countries, including 
Bangladesh, Bolivia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, and Sri-Lanka show that poor 
households do not gain from microfinance; it is only the non-poor borrowers with 
incomes above poverty lines that can benefit and enjoy considerable positive impacts 
from microfinance. What is more, the findings indicate a vast majority of poor 
households actually ended up with less incremental income after getting micro-loans, 
compared to those who did not get such loans.  
In addition, the benefits of microfinance are found to be positively correlated 
with household initial income, that is, the poorest are least likely to benefit from 
microfinance. For example, Kochar (2011) finds that benefits of microfinance are 
positively correlated with household initial income, i.e. the poorest are least likely to 
benefit from microfinance. Rural banks with the goal of increasing the availability of 
capital to the poorest regions of India actually had a larger effect on the per capita 
expenditure of the non-poor than that of the poor. There are also other studies that do 
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not find a statistically significant impact of microcredit on household income and 
household welfare (e.g. Coleman, 1999; Diagne & Zeller, 2001). 
Generally, there has been a wide divergence of opinions and research findings 
on the impact of microfinance on household welfare and poverty reduction, as well as 
its poverty targeting across countries in the world. The following part will continue to 
give empirical studies on microfinance in Vietnam. 
2.2. Review of Empirical Studies on Microfinance in Vietnam  
Although Vietnam stands out for the large-scale coverage of its microfinance system, 
questions regarding its achievement in antipoverty impact desired have been posed 
(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, 2011). There have been different studies on 
impacts of microfinance on poverty reduction and household welfare. 
Quach et al. (2004), using panel data from VHLSS 1993 and 1998, assess the 
impacts of microfinance on household welfare and the household poverty status. The 
author has applied probit regression to estimate the determinants of credit and the 
Heckman two-step method to estimate the impact of credit on household welfare. The 
findings show that access to credit has a long-term positive and significant impact on 
household welfare, in terms of consumption per capita, food consumption per capita, 
non-food consumption per capita, and on the household poverty status. However, the 
magnitude of this impact is found to be modest.  
Swain et al. (2008) employed the household survey data collected in 2006, 
from Hoa An, a commune in the Mekong Delta area, to examine the impact of 
microfinance on poverty reduction and compare the impacts between three groups, 
namely ‘dropout’ (those that had access to microfinance and successfully escaped 
from poverty), ‘poor member’ (those that had accessed microfinance but was still 
poor), and ‘non-member’ (those did not participate in any microfinance programme). 
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In order to obtain in-depth data, the researchers also used Participatory Rural 
Appraisal, Focus Group Discussions and in-depth interviews. The findings show that 
members have accumulated more and better quality assets than non-members; they 
also have opportunities to access training programmes and improve their social status. 
Doan et al. (2011) conducted a study to examine the impact of household 
credit on health care and education expenditure by poor households in peri-urban 
areas of Ho Chi Minh City. The impact is estimated by employing two methods: 
Propensity Score Matching and Multiple Treatment Effects with a sample of 411 
member and non-member households. The findings suggest that formal credit has 
positive impacts on education and health care spending, but no significant evidence is 
found for informal credit.  
Nghiem et al. (2012) analyse the impact of NGO microfinance programmes on 
household welfare by using quasi-experimental survey approach. The sample with 
470 households was designed to compare programme member households with non-
member households who have similar characteristics. The analysis shows no 
significant effects of participation in NGO microfinance on income and consumption 
per adult-equivalent. 
Duong & Nghiem (2013) used data retrieved from seven repeatedly cross-
sectional VHLSS in 1992-2010 to examine the impact of microfinance on poverty 
reduction. The authors employ provincial level fixed-effects to control for unobserved 
attributes to measure the impacts of microfinance on household welfare (income and 
consumption); and apply a mixed-process, seemingly unrelated estimator for 
sensitivity analysis. The findings indicate that both the access to and amount of credit 
have positive impacts on income and consumption. Interestingly, the results suggest 
consumption smoothing may be a stronger impact of microfinance, in comparison 
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with income generating. The results, however, show that access to microfinance has 
no significant effects on the poverty status of households, even though loan volume is 
associated significantly with the reduction in the probability of being poor. 
Overall, studies on microfinance in Vietnam are mainly focused on 
microfinance programmes as a whole, with less concern about poverty targeting and 
impact of microfinance programme implemented by a specific financial institution, 
e.g. Vietnam Bank for Social Policies, Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development. Since Vietnam Bank for Social Policies is considered an important 
policy tool of the government, which can make a great contribution to the 
implementation of National Target Programme on Hunger Elimination, Poverty 
Alleviation and Employment, it is rather important to examine the efficiency of the 
programme. So far, questions regarding poverty targeting of the Vietnam Bank for 
Social Policies’ governmental microcredit programme and its impacts on poverty 
reduction have just been addressed by only few studies.  
With cross-sectional and panel data drawn from VHLSS 2002 and 2004, 
Cuong (2008) employed two methods to estimate the impact of the programme: (1) 
instrumental variable (IV) regression and (2) fixed-effects with IV regression using 
panel data. IV used includes the poverty ratio of the commune and distance to the 
nearest bank. The author finds that the programme is not very pro-poor in terms of 
targeting. Specifically, the non-poor account for a larger proportion of the participants, 
and also tend to receive larger amounts of credit compared to the poor. However, the 
programme has positive impacts on income per capita, consumption per capita, and 
has reduced the poverty rate of the participants, which is found for all three Foster-
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Greer-Thorbecke poverty measures6.  
Lensink & Pham (2012), employing fixed-effects for panel data obtained from 
VHLSS 2004 and 2006, evaluate the impact of microcredit provided by the Vietnam 
Bank for Social Policies on household self-employment profits. The authors use 
access to credit, defined as the interaction of eligibility and treatment commune, and 
its interaction with different variables that proxy for household characteristics as a set 
of instruments. The study indicates that the programme enhances household self-
employment profits and has stronger impacts for the poorest households, which 
suggests poverty-reducing effects. The study also finds the programme remained 
mistargeted with high ratio7 of 41.2% and 37.8% in 2004 and 2006, respectively. 
The use of instrumental variables in these two studies is believed to help 
overcome the endogenous bias problem of programme participation. It is, however, 
questionable on the exclusion restriction condition of the instruments. For instance, if 
the commune has a higher poverty rate, it is reasonable to assume that the commune 
has a relatively worse business environment, compared to other communes whose 
poverty rates are lower, which can negatively affect the possibility of generating 
income of the household. 
In a nutshell, the microfinance sector is dynamic and appropriate 
enhancements are expected in theoretical, methodological, empirical and policy 
research methods. To contribute to the ongoing discussion of microfinance in 
Vietnam in general and governmental microfinance programmes in particular, this 
study provides further empirical evidences on the poverty-reducing effects of access 
to the preferential microcredit programme, and its poverty targeting characteristic 
                                                 
6  See more in Foster, J., Greer, J., & Thorbecke, E. (1984). A class of decomposable poverty 
measures. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 761-766. 
7  In the study by Lensink & Pham (2012), the ‘mistargeted ratio’ was calculated as the ratio of 
mistargeted to the total of mistargeted and participated. ‘Mistargeted ratio’, therefore, is not the leakage 
rate (or inclusion error rate) to be considered in this study. 
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using data from rural areas of Vietnam. 
3. DATA – VIETNAM HOUSEHOLD LIVING STANDARDS SURVEYS 
The study uses data from the Vietnam Household Living Standards Surveys (VHLSS), 
which have been implemented by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) 
with technical assistance from United Nations Development Programme and World 
Bank. Since 2002, the VHLSS has been conducted regularly every two years (Phung 
& Nguyen, 2004). 
The series of surveys rely on a master sample, which is recruited from the 
1999 Population Census enumeration areas using the multi-stage stratified random 
cluster sampling technique. Basically, communes are stratified on province and 
urban/rural, and 3 enumeration areas will then be selected for each commune. Both 
communes and enumeration areas are chosen with probability proportionate to the 
number of households according to Census 1999. The surveyed households in each 
enumeration area are selected based on the most updated list of the households in 
these areas and weight is used to readjust the population change (Phung & Nguyen, 
2004). 
The surveys collected information through household- and commune-level 
questionnaires. Regarding household questionnaire, there are 8 main parts: (1) basic 
demographics, (2) education, (3) health and health care, (4) employment and income, 
(5) expenditure, (6) housing, electricity, water, sanitation facilities and durable goods, 
(7) poverty reduction, (8) participation in poverty reduction programmes, including 
information on loans from poverty alleviation programmes that households had 
obtained or still owed within one year before the interview. 
Data on communal characteristics include: (1) demographics and general 
information, (2) general economic conditions and aid programmes, (3) non-farm 
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employment, (4) agricultural production, (5) local infrastructure and transportation, (6) 
education, (7) health care, (8) social affairs, and (9) credits and savings.  
Table 3.1: Summary of VHLSS 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 
Survey 
Total sample 
(Number of households) 
Number of 
communes 
Notes 
2004 9,188 Rural 6,938 2,266  
Urban 2,250 
2006 9,189 Rural 6,882 2,280 4,298 households (3,267 rural) 
from the 2004 survey Urban 2,307 
2008 9,189 Rural 6,837 2,219 4,138 households (3123 rural) 
from the 2006 survey Urban 2,352 
2010 9,399 Rural 6,750 2,199 No information 
Urban 2,649 
2012 9,399 Rural 6,696 2,218 4,173 households (3,071 rural) 
from the 2010 survey Urban 2,703 
With the research objectives of examining the poverty targeting and impacts 
of governmental microcredit programme on poverty reduction in rural Vietnam, the 
study’s sample is restricted to rural households only. Specifically, in the next section, 
‘Poverty Targeting’, data to be used includes all the rural households from each round 
of the survey from 2004 to 2012. For the impact assessment purpose, three balanced 
panels are constructed: 2004-2006, 2006-2008, and 2010-2012. Each panel consists of 
rural households that were interviewed in the two corresponding years, which will be 
discussed in detail in Section 5 ‘Impacts of the Governmental Microcredit 
Programme’. 
Despite the richness of the data, VHLSS is not an ideal dataset for specific 
research purposes like microfinance assessment. For example, the questionnaires do 
not specify the purposes of credit borrowing, whether a household participated in a 
credit and savings group, the number of households in each credit and savings group, 
whether it was the decision of the household not to participate in the microcredit 
programme, or whether it was the exclusion of the programme that made them unable 
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to receive credit. Above all, the main issue is that the study is using non-experimental 
data, it is, therefore, necessary to address the fact that households are not randomly 
assigned to the microcredit programme. 
4. POVERTY TARGETING 
Poverty targeting will be examined with four respects: (1) Socio-economic 
characteristics of the programme beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, (2) Error rate of 
the programme, (3) Coverage rate, credit amount and interest rate for eligible and 
ineligible groups, and (4) Group targeting. 
Researches have shown that expenditure-based indicators are found to be more 
reliable than indices that are income-based (Deaton, 1997; Filmer & Pritchett, 2001). 
Since households are classified as poor, mainly by the income-based national poverty 
standard, it would be better to examine the poverty targeting based on not only this 
index, but also other expenditure-based economic status indices. With the available 
data on household assets, the study estimates the wealth level of households by 
computing two indices using Principal Component Analysis, the method 
recommended by many studies in economics and public policy (Filmer & Pritchett, 
2001; McKenzie, 2004; Vyas & Kumaranayake, 2006; Labonne et al., 2007). The first 
index is ‘durable score’, computed from ownership of 36 different assets listed in the 
Appendix 2. The second index is ‘socio-economic score’, calculated from 
combination of housing characteristics 8 , access to utilities and infrastructure 
(electricity, sanitation facility), and durable asset ownership. Wealth level, beside 
income and consumption expenditure per capita, will then be used to examine the 
group targeting of the microcredit programme. 
                                                 
8 It is noted that information of housing characteristics (pole, roof and wall materials) is only available 
in the two surveys of 2010 and 2012. Therefore, socio-economic scores of 2004, 2006, and 2008 are 
calculated based on access to utilities and infrastructure, and durable asset ownership only. 
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4.1. Socio-economic Characteristics of Beneficiary and Non-beneficiary Group 
To begin with, the study directly compares the average households in the beneficiary 
and non-beneficiary group in terms of income and consumption expenditure per 
capita, durable and socio-economic score. On average, all the differences are 
statistically significant, suggesting that the programme beneficiaries are actually 
poorer than non-beneficiaries.  
Table 4.1: Socio-economic Characteristics by Group 
 
Beneficiaries 
Average 
Non-
beneficiaries 
Average 
Estimated 
Difference  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Year 2004 
   
Income per capita per month  
(VND/person/month) 
305.220 442.153 -136.934***  
(11.103) 
Consumption per capita per month 
(VND/person/month) 
244.395 295.764 -51.369*** 
(9.510) 
Durable score  -0.875 0.057 -0.933*** 
(0.090) 
Socio-economic score -0.956 0.063 -1.019*** 
(0.097) 
Number of observations 427 6511  
Panel B: Year 2006 
   
Income per capita per month 
(VND/person/month) 
404.752 572.024 -167.273*** 
(16.331) 
Consumption per capita per month 
(VND/person/month) 
303.540 374.909 -71.368*** 
(7.783) 
Durable score  -0.829 0.091 -0.920*** 
(0.081) 
Socio-economic score -0.906 0.099 -1.006*** 
(0.089) 
Number of observations 680 6202  
Panel D: Year 2008 
   
Income per capita per month  
(VND/person/month) 
595.592 837.504 -241.912*** 
(22.845) 
Consumption per capita per month 
(VND/person/month) 
494.839 576.536 -81.697*** 
(9.838) 
Durable score -0.705 0.126 -0.831*** 
(0.074) 
Socio-economic score -0.781 0.139 -0.920*** 
(0.080) 
Number of observations 1033 5804  
Panel D: Year 2010 
   
Income per capita per month 725.071 1,285.574 -560.503*** 
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(VND/person/month)  (48.867) 
Consumption per capita per month 
(VND/person/month) 
719.082 1,004.432 -285.349*** 
(21.052) 
Durable score -1.137 0.176 -1.312*** 
(0.085) 
Socio-economic score -1.544 0.239 -1.783*** 
(0.110) 
Number of observations 903 5847  
Panel E: Year 2012 
   
Income per capita per month  
(VND/person/month) 
1,014.637 1,813.040 -798.403*** 
(38.943) 
Consumption per capita per month 
(VND/person/month) 
981.299 1,345.523 -364.224*** 
(24.629) 
Durable scores  -1.298 0.195 -1.493*** 
(0.084) 
Socio-economic score -1.663 0.250 -1.912*** 
(0.109) 
Number of observation 874 5822  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels is 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
It could be seen that, in terms of average socio-economic characteristics of 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, specifically income per capita, consumption 
expenditure per capita, durable score, as well as socio-economic score, the 
microcredit programme seems doing well in targeting the poor. The average non-
beneficiaries have been better-off than the beneficiaries in all four respects over time. 
The next sub-section will try to figure out whether there exists a leakage problem in 
the programme, that is, whether there are ineligible households participating in the 
programme. 
4.2. Error Rates of the Programme 
In this sub-section, the study finds out the ‘error rate’ of targeting. ‘Error rate’ is 
defined to be equal to 1 if either the household was classified as poor by the local 
commune authorities or was in the commune with programme 135 but did not receive 
credit from the bank (exclusion error), or if it was not eligible and did receive credit 
(inclusion error). However, for the household that did not borrow from the bank, since 
the surveys do not indicate whether it was the household’s decision not to participate 
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in the programme (i.e. there is no demand for microcredit), or whether it was the 
exclusion of the programme that made them unable to receive credit (i.e. the 
household was rejected and was not on the list of beneficiaries), only the inclusion 
errors could be estimated based on the available data. 
Table 4.2: Inclusion Error of the Programme 
Year Beneficiaries Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
2004 427 0.2424 0.4286 
2006 680 0.2460 0.4307 
2008 1033 0.2055 0.4041 
2010 903 0.1985 0.3989 
2012 874 0.2007 0.4006 
The beneficiaries of the programme include not only eligible households but 
also ineligible households. In particular, the inclusion error rate is found to be quite 
high, with nearly 25% of the beneficiaries were actually not eligible to participate in 
the preferential microcredit programme in the year 2004, and 2006. Since 2008, the 
inclusion error rate has reduced to approximately 20% (Table 4.2). Still, this suggests 
the participation of non-eligible households in the programme has remained a 
problem over time. While being classified as poor by the local authorities is 
considered as an essential criterion for the credit programme, it is likely the ‘elite 
capture’ and the ‘exclusion process’ that could explain these errors. For example, the 
community process could favour friends and relatives of the elites, who are not in the 
poorer strata of the commune; or non-poor or even better-off households, who are 
likely to have higher capacity to repay the loans, actually receive nominations and get 
credits from the bank, which results in a lack of legitimacy with the process.  
4.3. Coverage Rate, Credit Amount and Interest Rate of In- and Eligible Group 
The study investigates how well the programme reaches eligible households. Data 
shows that only 11.43% and 18.84% of the eligible households in the rural areas 
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borrowed from the bank in 2004 and 2006, respectively, suggesting a relatively low 
coverage rate of the programme. The coverage rate, however, has been improved over 
time, with 28.61%, 30.14%, and 29.04% of the rural eligible households borrowed 
from the bank in 2008, 2010, and 2012, respectively. In addition, the eligible, on 
average, tended to receive smaller amounts of credit than the ineligible. Nevertheless, 
they were able to enjoy the relatively lower interest rate than the ineligible. 
Table 4.3: Coverage Rate, Average Credit Amount and Interest Rate of Programme  
 
Eligible 
Average 
Ineligible 
Average 
Total 
Average 
Difference 
(1)-(2) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Year 2004     
Coverage rate: % of borrowing households 11.43 4.17 6.15  
(0.73) (0.28) (0.29)  
Amount of borrowed credit (VND 1,000) 4,100 4,509 4,301 -408 
(213.22) (309.59) (186.92) (373.80) 
Average of monthly interest rate (%) 0.42 0.73 0.57 -0.31** 
(0.02) (0.12) (0.06) (0.12) 
Panel B: Year 2006     
Coverage rate: % of borrowing households 18.84 5.98 9.88  
(0.86) (0.34) (0.36)  
Amount of borrowed credit (VND 1,000) 5,347 6,916 6,009 -1,570* 
(165.91) (942.15) (409.72) (828.00) 
Average of monthly interest rate (%) 0.56 0.56 0.56 -0.01 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09) 
Panel C: Year 2008     
Coverage rate: % of borrowing households 28.61 9.65 15.11  
(1.02) (0.42) (0.43)  
Amount of borrowed credit (VND 1,000) 7,970 8,726 8,314 -755* 
(354.59) (259.94) (226.77) (455.01) 
Average of monthly interest rate (%) 0.61 0.59 0.60 0.03 
(0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) 
Panel D: Year 2010     
Coverage rate: % of borrowing households 30.14 6.73 13.38  
(1.05) (0.36) (0.41)  
Amount of borrowed credit (VND 1,000) 12,649 12,095 12,450 554 
(356.47) (482.31) (286.67) (597.31) 
Average of monthly interest rate (%) 0.45 0.50 0.47 -0.05** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Panel E: Year 2012     
Coverage rate: % of borrowing households 29.04 6.75 13.05  
(1.04) (0.36) (0.41)  
Amount of borrowed credit (VND 1,000) 15,239 16,789 15,813 -1,551** 
(429.59) (705.44) (376.74) (778.68) 
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Average of monthly interest rate (%) 0.49 0.56 0.51 -0.07*** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Notes: Average of monthly interest rate is calculated as weighted average interest rate of all the 
Vietnam Bank for Social Policies’ loans. For example, given a household has two loans of VND 5 
million and 2 million with interest rate of 0.65% and 0.8% per month, respectively, average interest 
rate is (0.65%*5+0.8%*2)/(5+2) = 0.69% per month. Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
4.4. Group Targeting of the Programme 
For further assessment of poverty targeting, particularly to examine the groups to 
which the programme beneficiaries are likely to belong, the study classifies rural 
households into five groups using quantiles of income-based and expenditure-based 
indicators.  
Data has shown that socio-economic status of the beneficiaries, in terms of 
income per capita and consumption per capita, on average, are quite similar to that of 
households who fall between the second poorest and the middle group (except for 
2008, the beneficiaries, on average, have higher income and consumption than the 
middle group). However, if we are able to control for the inclusion error, the 
programme beneficiaries are likely to be among the poorest and the second poorest 
group.  
Table 4.4: Group Targeting by Income per Capita per Month  
Unit: VND 1,000/person/month 
Year 
By quantiles of income per capita per month 
Beneficiaries 
Beneficiaries 
(Without 
Inclusion 
Error) 
Poorest 
(20%) 
Second Middle Fourth 
Richest 
(20%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
2004 
152.79 248.79 340.58 475.56 951.22 305.22 220.88 
(1.15) (0.68) (0.81) (1.43) (16.52) (9.92) (11.00) 
n 1388 1388 1387 1388 1387 427 132 
2006 
190.74 313.35 427.77 601.62 1244.37 404.75 291.26 
(1.44) (0.80) (1.01) (1.71) (24.78) (14.53) (15.88) 
n 1377 1376 1377 1376 1376 680 261 
2008 
252.01 419.31 586.49 841.71 1905.81 595.59 402.70 
(1.97) (1.23) (1.49) (2.77) (56.56) (17.42) (11.05) 
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n 1368 1367 1368 1367 1367 1033 383 
2010 
369.14 632.92 899.71 1292.90 2858.30 725.07 523.00 
(2.82) (2.00) (2.31) (4.26) (185.60) (19.09) (17.36) 
n 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 903 407 
2012 
496.27 901.11 1339.20 1945.11 3863.35 1014.64 748.52 
(3.61) (3.17) (3.86) (5.89) (61.54) (31.78) (27.75) 
n 1340 1339 1339 1339 1339 874 422 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the commune level. Column (7) is for sample of 
only those beneficiaries who are eligible for the programme (i.e. without inclusion error). 
Table 4.5: Group Targeting by Consumption per Capita per Month  
Unit: VND 1,000/person/month 
Year 
By quantiles of consumption per capita per month 
Beneficiaries 
Beneficiaries 
(Without 
Inclusion 
Error) 
Poorest 
(20%) 
Second Middle Fourth 
Richest 
(20%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
2004 
131.59 193.69 248.58 326.54 562.79 244.40 183.20 
(0.80) (0.42) (0.48) (0.79) (6.52) (9.22) (7.39) 
n 1388 1388 1387 1388 1387 427 132 
2006 
161.77 240.19 311.94 414.37 711.20 303.54 231.03 
(1.05) (0.51) (0.63) (1.03) (8.57) (7.18) (6.16) 
n 1377 1376 1377 1376 1376 680 261 
2008 
256.49 378.70 482.69 631.02 1072.36 494.84 373.79 
(1.63) (0.74) (0.94) (1.50) (11.75) (8.55) (8.95) 
n 1368 1367 1368 1367 1367 1033 383 
2010 
383.12 605.16 810.85 1087.21 1944.95 719.08 542.39 
(2.87) (1.51) (1.83) (2.78) (41.44) (17.25) (15.90) 
n 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 903 407 
2012 
524.44 828.27 1104.43 1477.70 2555.65 981.30 820.40 
(3.83) (2.01) (2.52) (3.68) (28.55) (21.66) (26.67) 
n 1340 1339 1339 1339 1339 874 422 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the commune level. Column (7) is for sample of 
only those beneficiaries who are eligible for the programme (i.e. without inclusion error). 
Table 4.6: Group Targeting by Durable Score  
Year 
By quantiles of durable score 
Beneficiaries 
Beneficiaries 
(Without 
Inclusion Error) 
Poorest 
(20%) 
Second Middle Fourth 
Richest 
(20%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
2004 
-2.44 -1.30 -0.28 0.75 3.26 -0.88 -1.77 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) 
n 1388 1388 1390 1385 1387 427 132 
2006 
-2.69 -1.29 -0.20 0.88 3.31 -0.83 -1.64 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) 
n 1394 1359 1377 1376 1376 680 261 
2008 
-3.01 -1.16 -0.01 1.07 3.12 -0.71 -1.73 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) 
n 1368 1368 1389 1345 1367 1033 383 
2010 -3.17 -1.13 0.05 1.16 3.11 -1.14 -2.16 
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(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) 
n 1350 1350 1351 1369 1330 903 407 
2012 
-3.33 -1.08 0.18 1.18 3.07 -1.30 -2.10 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.08) (0.10) 
n 1340 1346 1332 1348 1330 874 422 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the commune level. Column (7) is for sample of 
only those beneficiaries who are eligible for the programme (i.e. without inclusion error). 
Similarly, in terms of durable score and socio-economic score, Table 4.6 and 
4.7 show that on average, the programme beneficiaries somehow fall between the 
second poorest and the middle group (except for 2010 and 2012, the beneficiaries are 
among the poorest and the second poorest group). Without inclusion error, the 
beneficiaries are likely to belong to the poorest and the second poorest group. 
Table 4.7: Group Targeting by Socio-economic Score  
Year 
By quantiles of socio-economic score 
Beneficiaries 
Beneficiaries 
(Without  Error) Poorest 
(20%) 
Second Middle Fourth 
Richest 
(20%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
2004 
-2.72 -1.33 -0.23 0.87 3.42 -0.96 -1.90 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) 
n 1388 1388 1388 1387 1387 427 132 
2006 
-2.94 -1.31 -0.18 0.97 3.46 -0.91 -1.75 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) 
n 1377 1376 1377 1377 1375 680 261 
2008 
-3.24 -1.20 0.01 1.14 3.28 -0.78 -1.87 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.08) (0.10) 
n 1369 1366 1368 1367 1367 1033 383 
2010 
-3.99 -1.26 0.34 1.58 3.34 -1.54 -2.77 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.11) (0.13) 
n 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 903 407 
2012 
-4.13 -1.24 0.43 1.63 3.31 -1.66 -2.73 
(0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.11) (0.13) 
n 1340 1339 1339 1339 1339 874 422 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the commune level. Column (7) is for sample of 
only those beneficiaries who are eligible for the programme (i.e. without inclusion error). 
It could be seen that, by directly comparing the average socio-economic 
characteristics of the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, the programme seems 
sufficient in targeting the poor, with data showing the beneficiaries are poorer than 
non-beneficiaries in all four aspects. However, the high inclusion error rate suggests 
there is a large number of ineligible households participating in the programme and 
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enjoying the larger amount of credit, despite higher average interest rate. The 
programme, therefore, in fact, has actually insufficiently targeted the poor. Likewise, 
the programme failed to target the poorer strata of the rural households, that is, clients 
of the programme are close to median group, instead of the poorest group. The 
analysis from group targeting also suggests if the bank could control for the 
participation of ineligible households in the programme, the programme will be better 
reaching the poorer strata of the commune, albeit the poorest group is still excluded.  
There are three possible reasons behind the failure to target the poor of the 
programme. The first reason is the difference in the poverty definition between local 
commune authorities, that is, since the poverty classification is based on income 
poverty line set up by the Ministry of Labour, War Invalids and Social Affairs and 
other criteria set up by each commune, which can be different from one commune to 
another, there may be differences in perspectives on poverty across communes and 
over time. The second reason can be the ‘exclusion process’, that is, the local 
communities hesitate to nominate the poorest group of households for the microcredit 
programme; they instead include the less poor, non-poor or even better-off households, 
who are likely to have higher capacity to repay the loans, in the list of applicants. The 
third is perhaps the ‘elite capture’: friends and relatives of the elites, who are not in 
the poorer strata of the commune, could be favoured for the preferential credit. 
According to Morduch (1998), the issue of mistargeting may make it 
complicated to estimate the true impact of microcredit. However, as Pitt (1999) 
confirms, such mistargeting issue does not necessarily lead to the bias of impact 
estimation, which will be discussed in more detail in Section 5. 
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5. IMPACTS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL MICROCREDIT PROGRAMME 
5.1. Estimation Strategy 
The aim of this study is to examine whether participation in the Vietnam Bank for 
Social Policies’ preferential microcredit programme results in greater household 
welfare, in terms of income from profits 9 , consumption expenditure and food 
consumption expenditure. A natural starting point would be to estimate a model in 
which outcome, Yij is assumed to depend on participation in the programme, Dij, a set 
of household-specific controls, Xi and a set of commune-specific controls, Cj: 
𝐥𝐧 𝒀𝒊𝒋 = 𝜷𝟎𝒊𝒋 + 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝜷𝟏 + 𝑪𝒋𝜷𝟐 + 𝑫𝒊𝒋𝜷𝟑 + 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝜷𝟒 + 𝑬𝒊𝒋𝜷𝟓 + (𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 ∗ 𝑬𝒊𝒋)𝜷𝟔 + 𝜺𝒊𝒋, (1) 
where 𝜺𝒊𝒋  captures unobserved heterogeneity. The X vector includes observable 
exogenous household variables that are likely to be correlated with outcome, such as 
household size (number of household members), total land managed and used (annual 
and perennial crop land, forestry land, water surface, garden, and shifting-cultivation 
farmland), share of farming labour and dependence members10, age and marital status 
of the household head. 
The vector of commune characteristics, 𝐶𝑗, includes basic demographics of the 
commune, such as whether there is access to electricity, access to car road, access to 
public transport, access to post office, or inter- or intra-market in the commune.  
𝐷𝑖𝑗 indicates the household’s credit participation, measured by two proxies: (1) 
a binary variable indicating whether the household participated in the programme, and 
(2) a continuous variable indicating the loan amount taken from the programme.  
Year is a dummy variable that controls for the possible impact of a year-
specific shock on the household welfare (= 0 for the 1st year, and = 1 for the 2nd year 
                                                 
9 Income from profits is defined as the total profits from agriculture, forestry and aquaculture activities. 
10 In this study, a member is considered as dependent if they are under or over working age under the 
jurisdiction, according to the current Vietnam Labour Code (i.e. if they are under 15 years old, or over 
55 years old as for women, or over 60 years old as for men). 
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of each panel). 𝐸𝑖𝑗 is a binary variable, indicating whether the household is eligible 
for the programme, that is the household is either classified as poor by the commune 
authority, or residing in the poor commune with the programme 135 of the 
Government. The interaction between Year and Eligibility controls for different linear 
time trends between eligible and ineligible households. 
Despite the richness of the VHLSS, there may well be other unmeasured 
characteristics that distinguish the programme beneficiary from non-beneficiary and 
which cannot be controlled in the regression model. If conditional on the controls, 
these other characteristics are correlated with observable differences between the 
beneficiary and non-beneficiary, then the estimated impact of the programme will be 
biased. There are three important sources which can lead to bias. The first possibility 
is the endogenous decision of household to participate in the programme and the 
desired amount of loan. The second bias may come from the eligibility selection 
procedure of commune authority. The third may arise if the placement of 
microfinance programmes is non-random, that is, communes with microfinance 
programmes tend to be poorer than the villages or communes without them.  
To the extent that household and commune unobserved characteristics do not 
vary over time, then they can be absorbed in household-specific and commune-
specific fixed effects, 𝛽0𝑖𝑗. To measure the impact of credit participation on household 
welfare, specifically income from profits, consumption expenditure and food 
consumption expenditure, the study employs fixed-effects (FE) strategy, specified as 
below (2): 
𝐥𝐧 𝒀𝒊𝒋𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎𝒊𝒋 + 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒕𝜷𝟏 + 𝑪𝒋𝒕𝜷𝟐 + 𝑫𝒊𝒋𝒕𝜷𝟑 + 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕𝜷𝟒 + 𝑬𝒊𝒋𝒕𝜷𝟓 + (𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕 ∗ 𝑬𝒊𝒋𝒕)𝜷𝟔 + 𝜸𝒊𝒋 + 𝜹𝒋 + 𝜺𝒊𝒋𝒕 , 
in which,  𝛾𝑖𝑗  and 𝛿𝑗  are unobserved time-invariant variables at the household and 
commune level, respectively.  
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Although the fixed-effects estimator can control for unobserved and time-
invariant attributes that may both affect the outcome variable and the participation 
status of the households, it cannot solve the endogeneity problems mentioned above 
entirely, because the unobservable factors at both household and commune levels may 
vary over time. The fixed-effect model, therefore, may provide a consistent but biased 
estimate of the impact of microfinance on household welfare. 
 To overcome this issue, in combination with fixed-effects, the study uses 
instrumental variable for endogenous variable: microcredit participation. The main 
challenge is to choose a (set of) good instrument(s) that meets two conditions: (1) the 
instruments must be highly correlated with the participation status of the household, 
and (2) the instruments must be uncorrelated with the outcome variable, i.e. the 
instruments do not directly affect, and only affect the household welfare through the 
impact of credit participation. Following Lensink and Pham (2012), the study 
employs access to credit, defined as the interaction between a binary variable that 
reflects whether a household is eligible to participate in the programme, and a binary 
variable indicating whether that household resides in the treatment commune (a 
commune is defined as treated if there is access to the programme in the commune).  
As mentioned in the Section 3, for the purpose of impact assessment, the study 
uses three balanced panels: 2004-2006, 2006-2008, and 2010-2012. The first panel 
consists of 2,844 households (i.e. 5,688 observations) which appeared in two surveys 
2004 and 2006. The second panel includes 2,731 households (i.e. 5,462 observations) 
observed in surveys 2006 and 2008. There are 2,287 households (i.e. 4,574 
observations) in the panel 2010-2012. Details of the credit participation status in the 
three panels are as follows. 
Table 5.1: Household Credit Participation Status 
Unit: Household, VND million 
31 
 
 Panel  
2004-2006 
 
Panel  
2006-2008 
 
Panel  
2010-2012 
 2004 2006  2006 2008  2010 2012 
Borrower in both years 61 61  152 152  196 196 
      Average credit amount 4.256 5.050  5.138 7.675  13.240 17.072 
Borrower in 1st year only 130 NA  157 NA  234 NA 
      Average credit amount 4.608 0  6.256 0  11.657 0 
Borrower in 2nd year only NA 250  NA 311  NA 196 
      Average credit amount 0 5.984  0 9.076  0 15.143 
Total borrowers 191 311  309 463  430 392 
      Average credit amount 4.496 5.801  5.706 8.617  12.452 16.107 
5.2. Empirical Results and Discussion 
The estimation results for the impact of the programme on household profits for panel 
2004-2006, 2006-2008, and 2010-2012 are presented in tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4, 
respectively. 
The study begins with the panel 2004-2006. The first column is based on 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of model (1). These OLS estimates indicate 
that relative to those households who did not participate in the programme, the 
beneficiaries have a significantly lower household income from profits. The results 
demonstrate the disadvantaged backgrounds of the microcredit participants. Column 
(3) shows that when controlling for both observed and unobserved characteristics of 
households and communes that are fixed over time and have linear and additive 
influence on household welfare, the negative impact of the microcredit programme in 
the first column is simply an artifact of the disadvantages of participant households. 
Using fixed-effects with instrumental variable to overcome the endogeneity problems, 
estimation results in column (5) and (6) are consistent with the estimation results of 
the fixed-effects model. The larger magnitude of coefficients on the programme 
participation and credit amount, however, suggests that the fixed-effects model 
without instrumental variable does under-estimate the real impact of the microcredit 
programme on household income from profits. 
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The estimated coefficients from the panel 2004-2006 indicate that households 
who participate in the microcredit programme, relative to those who do not, have a 
higher income from profits of 18.41% (= e0.169 -1). Likewise, for each additional VND 
1 million of credit taken from the governmental microcredit programme, ceteris 
paribus, the household profits will increase by 3.46 percentage point (= e0.034 -1). 
Table 5.2: Impact of Credit Participation on Household Profits (2004-2006) 
Dependent variable is log of household income from profits 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed- 
Effects  
Fixed- 
Effects  
FE  
with IV 
FE  
with IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Credit participation       
Programme 
participation 
-0.069* 
(0.038) 
 
 
0.073** 
(0.035) 
 
 
0.169** 
(0.084) 
 
 
Credit amount  
   (VND million) 
 0.005 
(0.006) 
 
 
0.006 
(0.006) 
 
 
0.037** 
(0.019) 
Eligibility -0.302*** 
(0.038) 
-0.309*** 
(0.038) 
-0.121*** 
(0.044) 
-0.117*** 
(0.044) 
-0.129*** 
(0.045) 
-0.126*** 
(0.045) 
Year2006 0.029 
(0.032) 
0.027 
(0.032) 
0.050** 
(0.020) 
0.051*** 
(0.020) 
0.048** 
(0.020) 
0.047** 
(0.020) 
Time trend  
   (Year*Eligibility) 
-0.156*** 
(0.053) 
-0.162*** 
(0.053) 
-0.045 
(0.033) 
-0.043 
(0.033) 
-0.052 
(0.033) 
-0.055 
(0.034) 
Household characteristics 
Household size 0.408*** 
(0.038) 
0.407*** 
(0.037) 
0.228*** 
(0.044) 
0.229*** 
(0.045) 
0.226*** 
(0.044) 
0.227*** 
(0.045) 
Household size 
square 
-0.020*** 
(0.004) 
-0.020*** 
(0.004) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Total land (hectares) 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Share of farming   
   labour 
0.260*** 
(0.057) 
0.259*** 
(0.057) 
0.319*** 
(0.078) 
0.318*** 
(0.078) 
0.320*** 
(0.077) 
0.315*** 
(0.078) 
Share of dependence  
   members 
-0.502*** 
(0.053) 
-0.503*** 
(0.053) 
-0.310*** 
(0.104) 
-0.312*** 
(0.104) 
-0.308*** 
(0.105) 
-0.308*** 
(0.105) 
Age of household  
   head 
0.011 
(0.007) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.025) 
0.008 
(0.025) 
0.006 
(0.025) 
0.006 
(0.025) 
Age of household  
   head square 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Married household  
   head 
0.175*** 
(0.038) 
0.175*** 
(0.038) 
0.013 
(0.090) 
0.010 
(0.090) 
0.015 
(0.090) 
0.005 
(0.090) 
Commune characteristics 
Access to car road -0.283*** 
(0.070) 
-0.283*** 
(0.070) 
0.115 
(0.119) 
0.112 
(0.119) 
0.121 
(0.119) 
0.122 
(0.119) 
Access to public  
   transport 
0.072*** 
(0.024) 
0.074*** 
(0.024) 
-0.020 
(0.027) 
-0.020 
(0.027) 
-0.020 
(0.027) 
-0.016 
(0.027) 
Access to electricity -0.068 
(0.061) 
-0.071 
(0.061) 
0.077 
(0.079) 
0.079 
(0.079) 
0.076 
(0.078) 
0.085 
(0.078) 
Access to post office -0.065* 
(0.035) 
-0.064* 
(0.035) 
0.004 
(0.041) 
0.004 
(0.041) 
0.003 
(0.041) 
0.002 
(0.041) 
Access to market 0.025 
(0.025) 
0.025 
(0.025) 
0.015 
(0.036) 
0.015 
(0.036) 
0.014 
(0.036) 
0.014 
(0.036) 
Observations 5688 5688 5688 5688 5688 5688 
Number of households 2844 2844 2844 2844 2844 2844 
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Adjusted R2 0.235 0.234     
Kleibergen-Paap rk  
   LM statistic 
    156.331 102.112 
Cragg-Donald Wald F  
   statistic 
    
727.679 399.764 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
Similarly, the study applies the same estimation strategy for the two panels 
2006-2008, and 2010-2012. Although the estimation results are positive, and 
consistent with that of the panel 2004-2006, the impacts are found not to be 
statistically significant. 
Table 5.3: Impact of Credit Participation on Household Profits (2006-2008) 
Dependent variable is log of household income from profits 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed- 
Effects  
Fixed- 
Effects  
FE with 
IV 
FE with 
IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Credit participation     
Programme     
   participation 
-0.148*** 
(0.034) 
 
 
0.039 
(0.035) 
 
 
0.082 
(0.098) 
 
 
Credit amount  
   (VND million) 
 
 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
 
 
0.006 
(0.006) 
 
 
0.017 
(0.020) 
Eligibility -0.401*** 
(0.037) 
-0.416*** 
(0.037) 
-0.076* 
(0.046) 
-0.074 
(0.046) 
-0.078* 
(0.046) 
-0.076* 
(0.046) 
Year2008 0.091*** 
(0.031) 
0.089*** 
(0.031) 
0.065*** 
(0.021) 
0.065*** 
(0.021) 
0.064*** 
(0.021) 
0.062*** 
(0.021) 
Time trend  
(Year*Eligibility) 
-0.009 
(0.052) 
-0.010 
(0.052) 
-0.010 
(0.034) 
-0.011 
(0.034) 
-0.012 
(0.034) 
-0.016 
(0.035) 
Household characteristics      
Household size 0.452*** 
(0.032) 
0.450*** 
(0.033) 
0.322*** 
(0.045) 
0.321*** 
(0.045) 
0.322*** 
(0.045) 
0.320*** 
(0.045) 
Household size  
   square 
-0.026*** 
(0.003) 
-0.026*** 
(0.003) 
-0.020*** 
(0.003) 
-0.020*** 
(0.003) 
-0.020*** 
(0.003) 
-0.020*** 
(0.003) 
Total land (hectares) 0.013*** 
(0.002) 
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
Share of farming  
   labour 
0.251*** 
(0.062) 
0.250*** 
(0.062) 
0.281*** 
(0.080) 
0.279*** 
(0.080) 
0.283*** 
(0.080) 
0.279*** 
(0.080) 
Share of dependence  
   members 
-0.499*** 
(0.058) 
-0.497*** 
(0.058) 
-0.168 
(0.105) 
-0.167 
(0.105) 
-0.167 
(0.105) 
-0.164 
(0.105) 
Age of household  
   head 
0.013* 
(0.008) 
0.013* 
(0.008) 
0.019 
(0.023) 
0.019 
(0.023) 
0.019 
(0.023) 
0.019 
(0.022) 
Age of household  
   head square 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Married household  
   head 
0.161*** 
(0.043) 
0.161*** 
(0.043) 
0.014 
(0.099) 
0.014 
(0.099) 
0.014 
(0.099) 
0.016 
(0.099) 
Commune characteristics     
Access to car road -0.303*** 
(0.100) 
-0.309*** 
(0.101) 
0.025 
(0.156) 
0.025 
(0.156) 
0.027 
(0.154) 
0.030 
(0.155) 
Access to public  
   transport 
0.088*** 
(0.026) 
0.089*** 
(0.026) 
0.015 
(0.031) 
0.015 
(0.031) 
0.015 
(0.031) 
0.015 
(0.031) 
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Access to electricity 0.058 
(0.066) 
0.052 
(0.065) 
0.025 
(0.072) 
0.025 
(0.072) 
0.023 
(0.073) 
0.023 
(0.072) 
Access to post office -0.036 
(0.038) 
-0.038 
(0.038) 
0.042 
(0.052) 
0.042 
(0.052) 
0.042 
(0.052) 
0.039 
(0.053) 
Access to market 0.023 
(0.026) 
0.026 
(0.026) 
-0.060 
(0.045) 
-0.060 
(0.045) 
-0.061 
(0.045) 
-0.063 
(0.045) 
Observations 5462 5462 5462 5462 5462 5462 
Number of households 2731 2731 2731 2731 2731 2731 
Adjusted R2 0.290 0.288     
Kleibergen-Paap rk  
   LM statistic 
    130.588 83.648 
Cragg-Donald Wald F  
   statistic 
    361.693 177.711 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
Table 5.4: Impact of Credit Participation on Household Profits (2010-2012) 
Dependent variable is log of household income from profits 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed- 
Effects  
Fixed- 
Effects  
FE with 
IV 
FE with 
IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Credit participation     
Programme  
    participation 
-0.218*** 
(0.038) 
 
 
-0.007 
(0.049) 
 
 
0.049 
(0.112) 
 
 
Credit amount  
   (million VND) 
 
 
-0.019*** 
(0.005) 
 
 
0.001 
(0.006) 
 
 
0.009 
(0.020) 
Eligibility -0.265*** 
(0.044) 
-0.291*** 
(0.044) 
-0.030 
(0.055) 
-0.031 
(0.054) 
-0.037 
(0.057) 
-0.035 
(0.056) 
Year2012 0.136*** 
(0.037) 
0.136*** 
(0.037) 
0.122*** 
(0.026) 
0.122*** 
(0.026) 
0.123*** 
(0.026) 
0.123*** 
(0.026) 
Time trend  
(Year*Eligibility) 
-0.212*** 
(0.057) 
-0.206*** 
(0.058) 
-0.163*** 
(0.039) 
-0.163*** 
(0.039) 
-0.162*** 
(0.039) 
-0.164*** 
(0.039) 
Household characteristics     
Household size 0.531*** 
(0.044) 
0.527*** 
(0.045) 
0.350*** 
(0.063) 
0.349*** 
(0.063) 
0.349*** 
(0.063) 
0.348*** 
(0.062) 
Household size  
   square 
-0.034*** 
(0.004) 
-0.034*** 
(0.004) 
-0.021*** 
(0.006) 
-0.021*** 
(0.006) 
-0.021*** 
(0.006) 
-0.021*** 
(0.006) 
Total land (hectares) 0.019*** 
(0.002) 
0.019*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
Share of farming  
   labour 
0.571*** 
(0.080) 
0.562*** 
(0.080) 
0.554*** 
(0.102) 
0.554*** 
(0.103) 
0.553*** 
(0.102) 
0.554*** 
(0.102) 
Share of dependence  
   members 
-0.508*** 
(0.064) 
-0.506*** 
(0.064) 
-0.119 
(0.119) 
-0.120 
(0.120) 
-0.120 
(0.119) 
-0.121 
(0.119) 
Age of household  
   head 
0.025*** 
(0.008) 
0.025*** 
(0.008) 
0.042* 
(0.025) 
0.041* 
(0.025) 
0.041* 
(0.025) 
0.040 
(0.026) 
Age of household  
   head square 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Married household  
   head 
0.250*** 
(0.049) 
0.253*** 
(0.049) 
0.113 
(0.124) 
0.113 
(0.124) 
0.114 
(0.124) 
0.115 
(0.124) 
Commune characteristics      
Access to car road -0.293*** 
(0.087) 
-0.309*** 
(0.087) 
-0.123 
(0.139) 
-0.123 
(0.139) 
-0.127 
(0.139) 
-0.122 
(0.141) 
Access to public  
   transport 
0.041 
(0.031) 
0.042 
(0.031) 
-0.008 
(0.037) 
-0.008 
(0.037) 
-0.008 
(0.037) 
-0.009 
(0.037) 
Access to electricity 0.117 
(0.083) 
0.110 
(0.083) 
0.179 
(0.136) 
0.180 
(0.136) 
0.183 
(0.135) 
0.181 
(0.134) 
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Access to post office -0.053 
(0.049) 
-0.052 
(0.050) 
0.013 
(0.060) 
0.013 
(0.060) 
0.013 
(0.060) 
0.014 
(0.060) 
Access to market -0.035 
(0.031) 
-0.032 
(0.031) 
-0.126** 
(0.051) 
-0.126** 
(0.051) 
-0.127** 
(0.051) 
-0.127** 
(0.051) 
Observations 4574 4574 4574 4574 4574 4574 
Number of households 2287 2287 2287 2287 2287 2287 
Adjusted R2 0.295 0.292     
Kleibergen-Paap rk  
   LM statistic 
    119.833 83.679 
Cragg-Donald Wald F  
   statistic 
    401.935 226.972 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
For the impact estimations, the study also reports the effects of other 
explanatory variables on household income from profits. It could be seen that 
household assets, as captured by household size, total land used and managed, share 
of farming labour, appear to drive household profits. The positive coefficients on total 
land indicate that households that have more production land tend to gain higher 
profits, confirming the important role of land as a primary input of rural households. 
Since most rural households are involved in agriculture, forestry or aquaculture 
activities, with a proportion of over 60% in 2011 (See more in Appendix E), it is 
reasonable that having more land could generate higher profits. Besides, the positive 
coefficients on household size and negative coefficients on household size square 
suggest a non-linear relationship between the number of household members and the 
household profits (i.e. the effect of the household size could be positive up until a 
certain level, and then negative thereafter). The negative coefficients on the share of 
dependence members show that household with higher ratio of members who do not 
belong to the working force tends to achieve a lower profit. 
For further assessment of the impact on household profits across groups of 
households, the study conducts heterogeneity analysis by gender, and education level 
of household head. The estimation results presented in Table 5.5 suggest that for the 
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first period 2004-2006, the positive impacts of microcredit participation were driven 
by households whose head is male. However, the contradictory estimates for the panel 
2010-2012 makes it less convincing to conclude which group the microcredit 
programme has more positive impact on. 
In terms of education level of the household head, the study classifies 
households into two groups: ‘Low’ refers to those households whose head does not 
have any education degree, or has primary or lower-secondary education degree, and 
‘High’ for those households whose head has upper-secondary school degree and 
above, for example, bachelor, master, or Ph.D. Estimates in panel B suggest there is 
no much evidence about the different impacts of the programme across groups, except 
for the period 2004-2006, when the positive impacts were driven by the ‘Low’ group. 
Table 5.5: Estimations of Impact of Credit Participation on Household Profits, 
Stratified by Gender and Education of Household Head 
Dependent variable is log of household income from profits 
 Household and Commune Fixed-effects  
with Instrumental Variable 
 Panel 2004-2006  Panel 2006-2008  Panel 2010-2012 
Panel A: By gender of household head 
 Female Male  Female Male  Female Male 
Programme 
     participation 
-0.138 
(0.292) 
0.202** 
(0.085) 
 
-0.322 
(0.280) 
0.175 
(0.107) 
 
0.797** 
(0.378) 
-0.086 
(0.114) 
Credit amount 
      (VND million) 
-0.027 
(0.057) 
0.045** 
(0.019) 
 
-0.061 
(0.051) 
0.036 
(0.022) 
 
0.152** 
(0.077) 
-0.015 
(0.020) 
Number of observations 966 4518  964 4352  726 3756 
Number of households 483 2259  482 2176  363 1878 
Panel B: By education of household head 
 Low High  Low High  Low High 
Programme  
      participation 
0.201** 
(0.088) 
-0.417 
(0.282) 
 
0.052 
(0.103) 
0.198 
(0.351) 
 
0.044 
(0.118) 
0.135 
(0.535) 
Credit amount 
      (VND million) 
0.045** 
(0.020) 
-0.059 
(0.039) 
 
0.011 
(0.022) 
0.026 
(0.048) 
 
0.008 
(0.021) 
0.223 
(0.090) 
Number of observations 4986 482  4742 534  3514 412 
Number of households 2493 241  2371 267  1757 206 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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The study also employs the same strategy to estimate the impact of 
microcredit on household consumption expenditure and food consumption 
expenditure. The estimation results, however, are not statistically significant and not 
consistent over time. 
 It could be found from the analysis that, the microcredit programme was to 
bring about the positive impacts to beneficiary’s household welfare, in terms of 
income from profits. However, this positive effect became statistically insignificant 
for the later years. The study also found no evidence of microcredit impacts on 
household consumption expenditure and food consumption expenditure. 
 These findings, in line with other above-mentioned studies, imply that simply 
solely providing the credit at lower interest rates without collateral to poor households 
is not enough to help them improve their welfare. According to Khandker (1998), the 
usefulness of microcredit as a tool for reducing poverty depends much on the local 
circumstances. Unemployment or under-employment (i.e. low productivity) are the 
two intermediate determinants of poverty. If poverty results from unemployment, 
creating jobs is more appropriate. If poverty results from under-employment, 
increasing productivity through training or capital investment is more important. In 
this sense, for households in the rural areas of Vietnam, who are mostly working in 
the farming sector with low productivity of less than VND 29 million (approximately 
US$1,300) per capita per year (See more in Appendix F), providing non-financial 
support, including training besides the credit will be likely to contribute greatly to the 
effectiveness of microcredit programmes in poverty reduction. Training programmes 
could be listed as a mandatory condition of the loan to help the poor utilize their 
capital resource as suggested by Richardson (2000). 
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6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The study examines the poverty targeting and the impact of the governmental 
preferential credit programme for the poor from Vietnam Bank for Social Policies. 
The programme is designed to provide the credit at low interest rates without 
collateral. Using data from Vietnam Household Living Standards Surveys from 2004 
to 2012, restricted to rural sample only, it is found that, the programme has 
insufficiently targeted the poor, with a large number of ineligible households 
participating in the programme and enjoying the larger amount of credit, in spite of 
higher average interest rate. Likewise, the programme failed to target the poorer strata 
of the rural households, that is, clients of the programme are close to median group, 
instead of the poorest group, in terms of income from profits per capita, consumption 
expenditure and food consumption expenditure per capita, as well as durable and 
socio-economic score. The analysis from group targeting also suggests if the bank 
could control for the leakage problem, the programme will be better reaching the 
poorer strata of the commune, albeit the poorest group is still excluded. In order to 
improve the poverty targeting, the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies and the 
Government should have measures to reduce the inclusion error rate, that is, to control 
for the participation of ineligible households in the programme while keeping the 
programme effective. Further studies on the lending system, the group-lending 
method, and the classification procedure for poor households, as well as the local 
selection procedure for the list of eligible applicants, should be carried out to have 
more detailed suggestions for the programme modification. 
The study also examines the impacts of participating in the microfinance 
programme on rural household welfare, in terms of household income from profits, 
consumption expenditure and food consumption expenditure using three different 
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panels: 2004-2006, 2006-2008, and 2010-2012. Estimation results suggest that the 
governmental microfinance programme has statistically significant positive impact on 
household income from profits using panel 2004-2006. However, the study finds no 
evidence on the significant effect of the programme in the two periods 2006-2008, 
and 2010-2012, although the estimation results still suggest a positive effect. The 
study also finds no evidence on the effect of this programme on household 
consumption expenditure and food consumption expenditure. These findings, in line 
with other studies, suggest that the effectiveness of microcredit on poverty reduction 
depends on local circumstance. Vietnam Bank for Social Policies, besides providing 
preferential credit, should implement the training programmes to help poor 
households utilize the full potential of their financial resource in generating higher 
income from agricultural and non-agricultural production activities. These training 
programmes, however, are costly, which could lead to higher transaction costs, 
affecting the financial effectiveness of the bank. Further studies on the impact of the 
governmental microcredit programmes, in combination with training programmes, 
should be put more priority. 
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Appendix B: List of Assets Used to Compute Wealth Level 
Access to utilities  Ownership of durable assets  
1 National electricity 32 
Vacuum cleaner(s), dehumidifier(s), 
water filter(s) 
Ownership of durable assets 33 Microwave oven(s), baking oven(s) 
1 Automobile(s) 34 Juice extractor(s), citrus juicer(s) 
2 Motorbike(s) 35 Piano(s), keyboard(s) 
3 Bicycle(s) 36 Music rack of various kinds 
4 Ship(s), boat(s), junk(s), outer part with motor Sanitation facility 
5 Ship(s), boat(s), junk(s), outer part without motor 1 Septic/semi-septic tank 
6 Other means of travel 2 Sulabh 
7 Pumping machine(s) 3 Double septic tank 
8 Electricity generator(s) 4 Fishing bridge 
9 Printer(s) 5 Other types 
10 Fax machine(s) 6 No toilets 
11 Sewing machine(s) Housing characteristics  
(only available for vhlss 2010, 2012) 12 Video/DVD/digital player(s), satellite antenna 
13 Colour TV(s) Type of poles' material 
14 Landline telephone(s) 1 Reinforcement concrete 
15 Mobile phone(s) 2 Bricks/stones 
16 Black and white TV(s) 3 Iron/steel/good wood 
17 Radio/radio-cassette player(s) 4 Poor-quality wood/bamboo 
18 Disk player(s) 5 Others 
19 Computer(s)  type of roofs’ material 
20 Camera(s), video recorder(s) 1 Reinforcement concrete 
21 Refrigerator(s) 2 Tiles (cement, terracotta) 
22 Air conditioner(s) 3 Slabs (cement, metal) 
23 Washing/drying machine(s) 4 Leave/straw/rolled roofing 
24 Electric fan(s) 5 Others 
25 (Bath) water heater(s) Type of walls' material 
26 Gas/magnetic cooker(s) 1 Reinforcement concrete 
27 Electric/pressure cooker(s) 2 Bricks/stones 
28 Trolleys of various kinds 3 Wood/metal 
29 Cupboard(s), cabinet(s), wardrobe(s)  4 Calcareous soil/straw 
30 Bed(s) 5 Bamboo partitions/hardboards 
31 Desk(s), chair(s), long bench(es), table(s) 6 Others 
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Variable description 
2010 2012 
Mean S.D. 
Factor 
Score 
Mean S.D 
Factor 
Score 
Access to utilities              
 National electricity 0.953 0.211 0.163 0.956 0.206 0.162 
Ownership of durable assets             
 Automobile(s) 0.004 0.063 0.040 0.007 0.082 0.052 
 Motorbike(s) 0.712 0.453 0.152 0.764 0.425 0.137 
 Bicycle(s) 0.565 0.496 0.145 0.544 0.498 0.143 
 Ship(s), boat(s), junk(s), outer part with a motor 0.028 0.165 -0.003 0.028 0.164 -0.010 
 Ship(s), boat(s), junk(s), outer part without a motor 0.018 0.133 -0.012 0.016 0.124 -0.011 
 Other means of travel 0.002 0.045 0.008 0.001 0.030 0.007 
 Pumping machine(s) 0.455 0.498 0.200 0.467 0.499 0.190 
 Electricity generator(s) 0.026 0.159 0.021 0.024 0.153 0.001 
 Printer(s) 0.006 0.077 0.047 0.007 0.082 0.043 
 Fax machine(s) 0.000 0.021 0.007 0.000 0.021 0.021 
 Sewing machine(s) 0.050 0.218 0.012 0.041 0.197 0.002 
 Video/DVD/digital player(s), satellite antenna 0.545 0.498 0.152 0.512 0.500 0.137 
 Colour TV(s) 0.848 0.359 0.204 0.881 0.324 0.191 
 Landline telephone(s) 0.306 0.461 0.148 0.171 0.377 0.109 
 Mobile phone(s) 0.632 0.482 0.176 0.759 0.428 0.176 
 Black and white TV(s) 0.016 0.124 -0.052 0.010 0.100 -0.046 
 Radio/radio-cassette player(s) 0.044 0.204 0.028 0.029 0.169 0.008 
 Disk player(s) 0.024 0.153 0.013 0.019 0.137 0.023 
 Computer(s) 0.074 0.262 0.130 0.088 0.283 0.133 
 Camera(s), video recorder(s) 0.010 0.098 0.064 0.011 0.102 0.066 
 Refrigerator(s) 0.289 0.453 0.212 0.364 0.481 0.228 
 Air conditioner(s) 0.015 0.121 0.089 0.022 0.146 0.100 
 Washing/drying machine(s) 0.065 0.246 0.144 0.106 0.308 0.166 
 Electric fan(s) 0.805 0.397 0.219 0.834 0.372 0.212 
 (Bath) water heater(s) 0.057 0.232 0.145 0.084 0.278 0.158 
 Gas/magnetic cooker(s) 0.484 0.500 0.234 0.575 0.494 0.249 
 Electric/pressure cooker(s) 0.692 0.462 0.238 0.738 0.440 0.245 
 Trolleys of various kinds 0.010 0.101 0.033 0.010 0.099 0.037 
 Cupboard(s), cabinet(s), wardrobe(s)  0.747 0.435 0.202 0.798 0.401 0.210 
 Bed(s) 0.816 0.388 0.149 0.886 0.318 0.157 
 Desk(s), chair(s), long bench(es), dressing table(s) 0.609 0.488 0.207 0.660 0.474 0.210 
 Vacuum cleaner(s), dehumidifier(s), water filter(s) 0.007 0.085 0.057 0.011 0.103 0.063 
 Microwave oven(s), baking oven(s) 0.010 0.098 0.073 0.010 0.102 0.069 
 Juice extractor(s), citrus juicer(s) 0.085 0.279 0.143 0.098 0.297 0.143 
 Piano(s), keyboard(s) 0.002 0.040 0.027 0.001 0.035 0.013 
 Music rack of various kinds 0.117 0.322 0.099 0.115 0.318 0.099 
Sanitation facility             
 Septic/semi-septic tank 0.331 0.471 0.200 0.397 0.489 0.213 
 Sulabh 0.043 0.203 0.033 0.039 0.192 0.027 
 Double septic tank 0.183 0.386 0.054 0.161 0.368 0.028 
52 
 
 Fishing bridge 0.133 0.340 -0.086 0.118 0.323 -0.066 
 Other types 0.200 0.400 -0.121 0.198 0.398 -0.144 
 No toilets 0.110 0.313 -0.140 0.087 0.282 -0.146 
Housing characteristics             
      Type of poles' material             
  Reinforcement concrete 0.222 0.415 0.097 0.262 0.440 0.122 
  Bricks/stones 0.464 0.499 0.155 0.444 0.497 0.122 
  Iron/steel/good wood 0.166 0.372 -0.145 0.147 0.354 -0.135 
  Poor-quality wood/bamboo 0.141 0.348 -0.176 0.141 0.348 -0.186 
  Others 0.007 0.080 -0.026 0.004 0.066 -0.023 
      Type of roof's material             
  Reinforcement concrete 0.133 0.340 0.145 0.140 0.347 0.143 
  Tiles (cement, terracotta) 0.372 0.483 0.047 0.362 0.481 0.034 
  Slabs (cement, metal) 0.428 0.495 -0.082 0.451 0.498 -0.088 
  Leave/straw/rolled roofing 0.059 0.236 -0.123 0.044 0.205 -0.103 
  Others 0.006 0.080 -0.031 0.002 0.047 -0.026 
      Type of walls' material             
  Reinforcement concrete 0.017 0.128 0.036 0.019 0.137 0.036 
  Bricks/stones 0.665 0.472 0.257 0.688 0.464 0.249 
  Wood/metal 0.150 0.357 -0.141 0.153 0.360 -0.160 
  Calcareous soil/straw 0.034 0.181 -0.071 0.031 0.174 -0.082 
  Bamboo partitions/hardboards 0.064 0.244 -0.139 0.058 0.233 -0.133 
  Others 0.069 0.254 -0.111 0.051 0.220 -0.081 
Largest Eigenvalue 6.87 7.13 
Proportion of Variance Explained 11.65% 12.09% 
53 
 
Appendix D: Internal Validity of Principle Component Analysis 
Year 2004 Poorest 2 3 4 Richest 
Access to utilities            
 National electricity 57.64% 94.38% 98.92% 99.50% 99.78% 
Ownership of durable assets           
 Automobile(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.07% 1.95% 
 Motorbike(s) 8.50% 18.44% 37.03% 60.35% 86.81% 
 Bicycle(s) 40.13% 66.35% 78.82% 83.42% 77.58% 
 Ship(s), boat(s), junk(s), outer part with a motor 5.91% 5.12% 5.12% 5.34% 5.91% 
 Ship(s), boat(s), junk(s), outer part without a motor 4.76% 4.61% 4.61% 4.97% 2.38% 
 Other means of travel 0.22% 0.36% 0.65% 1.44% 1.44% 
 Pumping machine(s) 3.75% 14.70% 31.34% 52.70% 66.47% 
 Electricity generator(s) 4.97% 0.94% 0.72% 0.43% 1.37% 
 Printer(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.29% 
 Fax machine(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 
 Sewing machine(s) 4.54% 4.90% 6.20% 9.88% 16.51% 
 Video/DVD/digital player(s), satellite antenna 0.72% 4.18% 14.34% 40.81% 68.06% 
 Colour TV(s) 3.53% 29.18% 72.69% 95.67% 99.21% 
 Landline telephone(s) 0.00% 0.22% 0.50% 3.46% 48.31% 
 Mobile phone(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.14% 10.74% 
 Black and white TV(s) 27.52% 23.13% 8.29% 2.02% 0.58% 
 Radio/radio-cassette player(s) 15.42% 20.32% 18.37% 21.20% 23.72% 
 Disk player(s) 0.22% 0.50% 1.37% 1.59% 5.05% 
 Computer(s) 0.07% 0.00% 0.00% 0.43% 7.43% 
 Camera(s), video recorder(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 2.52% 
 Refrigerator(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.36% 1.95% 32.44% 
 Air conditioner(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.01% 
 Washing/drying machine(s) 0.00% 0.07% 0.07% 0.00% 5.26% 
 Electric fan(s) 21.04% 68.59% 85.23% 94.74% 95.46% 
 (Bath) water heater(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 4.90% 
 Gas/magnetic cooker(s) 0.43% 2.88% 5.69% 14.06% 62.87% 
 Electric/pressure cooker(s) 0.86% 12.54% 34.58% 65.54% 88.90% 
 Trolleys of various kinds 0.00% 0.36% 0.50% 0.50% 0.94% 
 Cupboard(s), cabinet(s), wardrobe(s)  28.39% 60.66% 83.79% 93.37% 96.97% 
 Bed(s) 62.25% 90.99% 95.32% 97.26% 97.19% 
 Desk(s), chair(s), long bench(es), dressing table(s) 19.81% 54.32% 70.39% 79.60% 86.45% 
 Vacuum cleaner(s), dehumidifier(s), water filter(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.22% 0.14% 0.87% 
 Microwave oven(s), baking oven(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.43% 
 Juice extractor(s), citrus juicer(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.43% 10.38% 
 Piano(s), keyboard(s) 2.52% 4.61% 5.91% 8.36% 8.80% 
 Music rack of various kinds 0.36% 0.50% 1.80% 5.34% 22.71% 
Sanitation facility           
 Septic/semi-septic tank 0.07% 1.59% 3.96% 12.55% 45.57% 
 Sulabh 0.43% 0.50% 1.66% 2.67% 8.00% 
 Double septic tank 3.46% 18.23% 30.84% 38.50% 22.21% 
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 Fishing bridge 12.75% 16.35% 14.41% 14.78% 8.51% 
 Other types 44.52% 41.28% 33.14% 22.28% 11.61% 
 No toilets 38.76% 22.05% 15.99% 9.23% 4.11% 
Average SES Index  
(Mean Scores for First Principal Component) -2.724 -1.327 -0.231 0.866 3.419 
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Year 2006 Poorest 2 3 4 Richest 
Access to utilities            
 National electricity 70.73% 97.82% 99.64% 99.71% 99.78% 
Ownership of durable assets           
 Automobile(s) 0.00% 0.07% 0.07% 0.44% 2.40% 
 Motorbike(s) 15.90% 27.76% 53.67% 74.58% 92.07% 
 Bicycle(s) 40.67% 65.77% 77.78% 78.43% 73.53% 
 Ship(s), boat(s), junk(s), outer part with a motor 2.54% 3.13% 5.16% 5.95% 7.35% 
 Ship(s), boat(s), junk(s), outer part without a motor 4.50% 3.42% 3.27% 3.49% 2.76% 
 Other means of travel 0.00% 0.44% 0.29% 1.09% 1.53% 
 Pumping machine(s) 3.99% 17.30% 33.55% 55.92% 68.15% 
 Electricity generator(s) 3.63% 0.80% 0.36% 0.22% 1.82% 
 Printer(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.07% 0.58% 
 Fax machine(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 
 Sewing machine(s) 4.43% 3.13% 4.65% 8.86% 16.51% 
 Video/DVD/digital player(s), satellite antenna 3.78% 16.86% 39.22% 59.40% 75.49% 
 Colour TV(s) 11.33% 61.70% 92.16% 96.88% 99.27% 
 Landline telephone(s) 0.15% 0.73% 4.14% 18.74% 68.07% 
 Mobile phone(s) 0.15% 0.36% 1.23% 5.66% 37.89% 
 Black and white TV(s) 21.93% 12.28% 2.54% 1.31% 0.65% 
 Radio/radio-cassette player(s) 10.38% 8.79% 9.44% 12.71% 16.15% 
 Disk player(s) 0.44% 0.87% 2.18% 3.34% 4.15% 
 Computer(s) 0.00% 0.07% 0.36% 1.02% 11.56% 
 Camera(s), video recorder(s) 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% 0.00% 2.76% 
 Refrigerator(s) 0.07% 0.51% 1.60% 6.61% 48.15% 
 Air conditioner(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.67% 
 Washing/drying machine(s) 0.00% 0.15% 0.00% 0.29% 9.09% 
 Electric fan(s) 30.21% 73.98% 89.62% 93.25% 97.09% 
 (Bath) water heater(s) 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% 0.07% 7.78% 
 Gas/magnetic cooker(s) 0.58% 2.33% 7.77% 32.39% 79.78% 
 Electric/pressure cooker(s) 3.99% 24.27% 52.51% 78.50% 91.42% 
 Trolleys of various kinds 0.07% 0.36% 0.44% 0.58% 1.75% 
 Cupboard(s), cabinet(s), wardrobe(s)  30.72% 66.28% 87.94% 94.55% 96.80% 
 Bed(s) 65.29% 89.68% 95.57% 96.59% 96.36% 
 Desk(s), chair(s), long bench(es), dressing table(s) 21.86% 54.14% 70.37% 81.70% 88.65% 
 Vacuum cleaner(s), dehumidifier(s), water filter(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.22% 1.38% 
 Microwave oven(s), baking oven(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.02% 
 Juice extractor(s), citrus juicer(s) 0.07% 0.00% 0.22% 1.09% 16.51% 
 Piano(s), keyboard(s) 2.76% 3.85% 5.52% 7.26% 8.51% 
 Music rack of various kinds 0.36% 1.89% 5.01% 13.80% 29.24% 
Sanitation facility           
 Septic/semi-septic tank 0.29% 2.69% 6.75% 21.93% 56.51% 
 Sulabh 0.58% 1.38% 2.11% 6.54% 8.73% 
 Double septic tank 7.77% 27.11% 34.50% 32.39% 16.65% 
 Fishing bridge 13.44% 16.50% 13.22% 13.80% 9.67% 
 Other types 40.52% 37.21% 30.86% 18.30% 6.25% 
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 No toilets 37.40% 15.12% 12.56% 6.97% 2.18% 
Average SES Index  
(Mean Scores for First Principal Component) -2.940 -1.313 -0.177 0.969 3.464 
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Year 2008 Poorest 2 3 4 Richest 
Access to utilities            
 National electricity 80.50% 98.68% 99.78% 99.78% 99.93% 
Ownership of durable assets           
 Automobile(s) 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% 0.80% 4.54% 
 Motorbike(s) 25.86% 44.58% 68.20% 86.47% 94.59% 
 Bicycle(s) 34.11% 65.89% 79.46% 77.76% 75.05% 
 Ship(s), boat(s), junk(s), outer part with a motor 2.12% 4.47% 4.82% 6.58% 5.93% 
 Ship(s), boat(s), junk(s), outer part without a motor 2.63% 3.29% 3.44% 3.22% 2.27% 
 Other means of travel 0.00% 0.22% 0.15% 1.10% 1.98% 
 Pumping machine(s) 7.89% 24.60% 50.44% 63.42% 74.69% 
 Electricity generator(s) 2.70% 0.44% 0.15% 0.44% 3.22% 
 Printer(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.10% 
 Fax machine(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.22% 
 Sewing machine(s) 5.33% 4.69% 5.70% 8.34% 12.95% 
 Video/DVD/digital player(s), satellite antenna 12.42% 33.46% 55.92% 69.79% 79.37% 
 Colour TV(s) 35.06% 87.55% 97.88% 99.27% 99.56% 
 Landline telephone(s) 3.58% 14.42% 30.92% 54.13% 83.47% 
 Mobile phone(s) 3.87% 14.28% 30.26% 49.45% 76.96% 
 Black and white TV(s) 11.32% 2.34% 0.95% 0.29% 0.29% 
 Radio/radio-cassette player(s) 5.99% 4.54% 4.17% 7.90% 9.36% 
 Disk player(s) 1.53% 2.71% 3.36% 4.54% 3.95% 
 Computer(s) 0.00% 0.22% 0.37% 2.27% 19.68% 
 Camera(s), video recorder(s) 0.00% 0.07% 0.07% 0.29% 2.78% 
 Refrigerator(s) 0.29% 1.61% 5.41% 19.39% 71.54% 
 Air conditioner(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 3.88% 
 Washing/drying machine(s) 0.00% 0.15% 0.00% 0.59% 18.22% 
 Electric fan(s) 40.83% 81.84% 92.40% 94.37% 95.68% 
 (bath) water heater(s) 0.00% 0.07% 0.22% 0.88% 17.63% 
 Gas/magnetic cooker(s) 1.31% 8.35% 20.32% 54.21% 87.13% 
 Electric/pressure cooker(s) 12.78% 46.85% 72.88% 86.32% 94.73% 
 Trolleys of various kinds 0.07% 0.44% 1.02% 1.02% 2.41% 
 Cupboard(s), cabinet(s), wardrobe(s)  35.65% 77.60% 91.59% 96.20% 97.51% 
 Bed(s) 66.62% 90.19% 96.13% 95.32% 96.93% 
 Desk(s), chair(s), long bench(es), dressing table(s) 27.25% 56.59% 74.63% 84.35% 90.56% 
 Vacuum cleaner(s), dehumidifier(s), water filter(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.07% 2.49% 
 Microwave oven(s), baking oven(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.85% 
 Juice extractor(s), citrus juicer(s) 0.00% 0.37% 0.80% 3.07% 22.68% 
 Piano(s), keyboard(s) 5.04% 7.91% 10.38% 16.17% 26.04% 
 Music rack of various kinds 0.88% 5.34% 9.28% 18.73% 33.94% 
Sanitation facility           
 Septic/semi-septic tank 1.46% 4.98% 12.65% 32.33% 68.03% 
 Sulabh 0.80% 2.49% 3.95% 7.24% 9.58% 
 Double septic tank 10.88% 25.18% 36.99% 30.87% 11.49% 
 Fishing bridge 9.06% 17.20% 15.35% 12.87% 6.22% 
 Other types 40.91% 33.67% 22.44% 12.36% 3.29% 
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 No toilets 36.89% 16.47% 8.63% 4.32% 1.39% 
Average SES Index (Mean Scores for First 
Principal Component) -3.238 -1.195 0.010 1.144 3.282 
 
  
59 
 
Year 2010 Poorest 2 3 4 Richest 
Access to utilities            
 National electricity 77.93% 99.19% 99.78% 99.78% 100.00% 
Ownership of durable assets           
 Automobile(s) 0.07% 0.07% 0.00% 0.07% 1.78% 
 Motorbike(s) 45.19% 60.67% 68.44% 85.41% 96.37% 
 Bicycle(s) 23.19% 47.78% 63.41% 73.33% 74.89% 
 Ship(s), boat(s), junk(s), outer part with a motor 2.37% 3.85% 3.19% 2.59% 2.00% 
 Ship(s), boat(s), junk(s), outer part without a motor 2.74% 2.00% 1.56% 1.78% 0.96% 
 Other means of travel 0.15% 0.07% 0.15% 0.22% 0.44% 
 Pumping machine(s) 8.07% 27.26% 45.85% 64.44% 82.07% 
 Electricity generator(s) 3.93% 0.59% 0.67% 1.04% 6.74% 
 Printer(s) 0.00% 0.15% 0.07% 0.22% 2.52% 
 Fax machine(s) 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% 0.07% 0.07% 
 Sewing machine(s) 4.74% 3.93% 3.63% 5.33% 7.41% 
 Video/DVD/digital player(s), satellite antenna 25.85% 47.41% 48.81% 67.19% 83.26% 
 Colour TV(s) 49.93% 82.37% 94.22% 98.37% 99.33% 
 Landline telephone(s) 7.93% 18.74% 28.74% 36.44% 61.19% 
 Mobile phone(s) 28.22% 55.11% 61.11% 81.11% 90.44% 
 Black and white TV(s) 4.96% 1.33% 0.96% 0.37% 0.22% 
 Radio/radio-cassette player(s) 3.04% 3.70% 2.96% 4.30% 7.85% 
 Disk player(s) 1.85% 1.93% 2.22% 3.19% 2.74% 
 Computer(s) 0.15% 1.70% 2.22% 5.70% 27.33% 
 Camera(s), video recorder(s) 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% 0.59% 4.15% 
 Refrigerator(s) 1.33% 9.48% 19.11% 35.85% 78.59% 
 Air conditioner(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.44% 7.04% 
 Washing/drying machine(s) 0.07% 0.22% 1.56% 3.48% 27.04% 
 Electric fan(s) 36.30% 79.63% 91.63% 96.07% 98.67% 
 (bath) water heater(s) 0.07% 0.15% 0.74% 2.22% 25.48% 
 Gas/magnetic cooker(s) 5.04% 28.22% 44.07% 69.48% 95.19% 
 Electric/pressure cooker(s) 17.78% 57.85% 80.15% 92.74% 97.56% 
 Trolleys of various kinds 0.15% 0.44% 0.52% 1.41% 2.59% 
 Cupboard(s), cabinet(s), wardrobe(s)  35.26% 66.59% 80.52% 93.70% 97.26% 
 Bed(s) 54.59% 79.78% 86.00% 91.33% 96.15% 
 Desk(s), chair(s), long bench(es), dressing table(s) 17.93% 46.81% 66.07% 82.00% 91.78% 
 Vacuum cleaner(s), dehumidifier(s), water filter(s) 0.00% 0.22% 0.07% 0.30% 3.04% 
 Microwave oven(s), baking oven(s) 0.00% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 4.67% 
 Juice extractor(s), citrus juicer(s) 0.00% 1.41% 2.59% 6.89% 31.56% 
 Piano(s), keyboard(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.15% 0.67% 
 Music rack of various kinds 1.78% 7.48% 8.22% 13.56% 27.70% 
Sanitation facility           
 Septic/semi-septic tank 3.33% 14.52% 27.70% 42.44% 77.56% 
 Sulabh 0.74% 2.96% 5.11% 7.41% 5.33% 
 Double septic tank 2.59% 14.74% 29.19% 31.93% 12.81% 
 Fishing bridge 22.37% 26.15% 10.59% 5.85% 1.56% 
 Other types 39.41% 29.19% 18.81% 10.15% 2.37% 
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 No toilets 31.56% 12.44% 8.59% 2.22% 0.30% 
Housing characteristics           
      Type of poles' material           
 Reinforcement concrete 6.44% 17.63% 22.59% 28.15% 36.00% 
 Bricks/stones 7.11% 36.67% 60.15% 65.63% 62.44% 
 Iron/steel/good wood 41.11% 22.96% 12.52% 5.04% 1.33% 
 Poor-quality wood/bamboo 43.41% 21.19% 4.67% 1.04% 0.07% 
 Others 1.56% 1.48% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 
      Type of roof's material           
 Reinforcement concrete 0.30% 1.70% 8.89% 15.93% 39.70% 
 Tiles (cement, terracotta) 20.15% 36.00% 48.44% 49.33% 32.22% 
 Slabs (cement, metal) 56.30% 54.30% 41.41% 34.15% 27.70% 
 Leave/straw/rolled roofing 20.96% 7.41% 0.74% 0.52% 0.07% 
 Others 1.93% 0.52% 0.52% 0.00% 0.22% 
      Type of walls' material           
 Reinforcement concrete 0.15% 0.52% 2.00% 2.44% 3.19% 
 Bricks/stones 9.93% 48.30% 83.56% 94.67% 95.93% 
 Wood/metal 35.93% 26.00% 10.44% 2.00% 0.74% 
 Calcareous soil/straw 9.11% 6.52% 1.04% 0.30% 0.07% 
 Bamboo partitions/hardboards 23.63% 6.96% 1.04% 0.22% 0.00% 
 Others 20.89% 11.63% 1.93% 0.30% 0.00% 
Average SES Index  
(Mean Scores for First Principal Component) -3.992 -1.264 0.340 1.581 3.335 
 
  
61 
 
Year 2012 Poorest 2 3 4 Richest 
Access to utilities            
 National electricity 79.03% 99.10% 99.85% 99.93% 100.00% 
Ownership of durable assets           
 Automobile(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.45% 2.84% 
 Motorbike(s) 54.78% 64.30% 76.18% 89.92% 96.86% 
 Bicycle(s) 21.42% 46.75% 61.76% 69.75% 72.52% 
 Ship(s), boat(s), junk(s), outer part with a motor 2.39% 4.85% 2.84% 2.54% 1.19% 
 Ship(s), boat(s), junk(s), outer part without a motor 1.79% 2.69% 1.49% 1.27% 0.52% 
 Other means of travel 0.00% 0.00% 0.15% 0.22% 0.07% 
 Pumping machine(s) 9.18% 29.50% 49.37% 66.02% 79.61% 
 Electricity generator(s) 4.93% 0.37% 0.30% 0.60% 5.83% 
 Printer(s) 0.15% 0.07% 0.22% 0.22% 2.69% 
 Fax machine(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.22% 
 Sewing machine(s) 4.48% 2.46% 4.18% 3.44% 5.75% 
 Video/DVD/digital player(s), satellite antenna 27.39% 40.63% 48.10% 59.97% 80.06% 
 Colour TV(s) 57.84% 87.23% 96.12% 99.48% 99.93% 
 Landline telephone(s) 3.81% 10.53% 13.59% 20.01% 37.57% 
 Mobile phone(s) 42.84% 67.81% 79.61% 92.01% 97.01% 
 Black and white TV(s) 3.73% 0.67% 0.45% 0.15% 0.07% 
 Radio/radio-cassette player(s) 2.99% 2.39% 2.76% 2.09% 4.41% 
 Disk player(s) 0.52% 1.64% 1.87% 2.69% 2.91% 
 Computer(s) 0.37% 1.49% 3.21% 6.95% 32.04% 
 Camera(s), video recorder(s) 0.00% 0.15% 0.07% 0.15% 4.93% 
 Refrigerator(s) 1.19% 13.29% 23.53% 53.17% 90.66% 
 Air conditioner(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.15% 0.22% 10.46% 
 Washing/drying machine(s) 0.15% 0.82% 1.12% 6.42% 44.36% 
 Electric fan(s) 42.54% 84.24% 95.15% 97.09% 98.13% 
 (bath) water heater(s) 0.00% 0.07% 0.52% 3.96% 37.57% 
 Gas/magnetic cooker(s) 6.57% 36.45% 59.97% 86.78% 97.98% 
 Electric/pressure cooker(s) 19.18% 68.04% 87.53% 95.30% 98.95% 
 Trolleys of various kinds 0.00% 0.30% 0.67% 0.97% 2.99% 
 Cupboard(s), cabinet(s), wardrobe(s)  39.70% 74.01% 89.25% 97.09% 99.03% 
 Bed(s) 62.31% 89.99% 95.37% 97.98% 97.31% 
 Desk(s), chair(s), long bench(es), dressing table(s) 22.09% 52.95% 73.56% 87.15% 94.32% 
 Vacuum cleaner(s), dehumidifier(s), water filter(s) 0.07% 0.00% 0.22% 0.30% 4.78% 
 Microwave oven(s), baking oven(s) 0.00% 0.00% 0.15% 0.15% 4.93% 
 Juice extractor(s), citrus juicer(s) 0.00% 0.82% 3.58% 7.92% 36.74% 
 Piano(s), keyboard(s) 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% 0.22% 0.30% 
 Music rack of various kinds 1.49% 6.42% 8.14% 13.89% 27.33% 
Sanitation facility           
 Septic/semi-septic tank 4.93% 17.25% 32.71% 55.79% 87.68% 
 Sulabh 0.75% 2.91% 5.23% 6.57% 3.81% 
 Double septic tank 4.70% 16.95% 26.81% 25.39% 6.87% 
 Fishing bridge 16.42% 24.79% 12.32% 4.93% 0.67% 
 Other types 45.07% 28.23% 18.37% 6.20% 0.97% 
62 
 
 No toilets 28.13% 9.86% 4.56% 1.12% 0.00% 
Housing characteristics           
      Type of poles' material           
 Reinforcement concrete 5.30% 17.40% 28.16% 34.95% 45.41% 
 Bricks/stones 10.90% 39.36% 58.10% 61.09% 52.73% 
 Iron/steel/good wood 36.34% 20.24% 11.43% 3.73% 1.79% 
 Poor-quality wood/bamboo 46.34% 21.73% 2.32% 0.22% 0.07% 
 Others 0.97% 1.19% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
      Type of roof's material           
 Reinforcement concrete 0.22% 2.39% 8.22% 18.67% 40.33% 
 Tiles (cement, terracotta) 21.64% 38.39% 46.60% 45.18% 29.42% 
 Slabs (cement, metal) 61.19% 53.25% 44.88% 36.15% 30.25% 
 Leave/straw/rolled roofing 15.90% 5.68% 0.30% 0.00% 0.00% 
 Others 0.90% 0.22% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
      Type of walls' material           
 Reinforcement concrete 0.22% 0.45% 2.39% 2.61% 3.96% 
 Bricks/stones 13.13% 53.10% 86.56% 95.67% 95.37% 
 Wood/metal 41.49% 25.17% 7.84% 1.34% 0.45% 
 Calcareous soil/straw 10.22% 4.48% 0.67% 0.07% 0.15% 
 Bamboo partitions/hardboards 22.09% 5.45% 1.12% 0.07% 0.07% 
 Others 12.69% 11.28% 1.42% 0.22% 0.00% 
Average SES Index  
(Mean Scores for First Principal Component) -4.125 -1.238 0.428 1.633 3.305 
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Appendix E: Proportion of Rural Households by Economic Sectors 
Unit: Household, % 
 2001 2006 2011 
 Number % Number % Number % 
Total  13,065,756 100 1,376,472 100 15,347,921 100 
Agriculture-Forestry-Fishery 10,573,756 80.9 9,783,644 71.1 9,515,835 62.1 
Industry - Construction 752,204 5.8 1,401,943 10.2 2,260,870 14.7 
Services 1,381,121 10.6 2,054,193 14.9 2,828,203 18.4 
Others 358,704 2.7 528,692 3.8 742,993 4.8 
Source: Summary of ‘Rural, Agricultural and Fishery Census 2001, 2006, and 2011’ 
Appendix F: Social Productivity of Agriculture-Forestry-Fishery Sector 
Unit: VND million/person/year 
 
Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam 
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